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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone covers.  To cover is to tone down a disfavored identity to
fit into the mainstream.  In our increasingly diverse society, all of us
are outside the mainstream in some way.  Nonetheless, being
deemed mainstream is still often a necessity of social life.  For this
reason, every[one] . . . has covered, whether consciously or not, and
sometimes at significant personal cost.1
On the surface all is well.  In our modern society, covering2 may seem
like a thing of the past, a distant concept no longer applicable to our
egalitarian social order.  After all, we rose above the stereotypes of the
past and became more tolerant.  We evolved and emerged as more fair-
minded, well-intentioned people.  In sum, we emerged as more under-
standing of others who are not exactly like most of us.  And judging by
the media portrayal of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (collec-
tively LGBT) issues, we are now more comfortable and accepting of sex-
ual minorities.3
1. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS, at ix
(2006).
2. See YOSHINO, supra note 1 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102 (2d prtg. 1964)).  Goffman writes that “[i]t is a
fact that persons who are ready to admit possession of a stigma (in many cases because it is
known about or immediately apparent) may nonetheless make a great effort to keep the
stigma from looming large. . . .  This process will be referred to as covering.”  Id. (emphasis
omitted).
3. Over the past two decades, there have been several TV shows portraying LGBT
themes, most notably, Ellen DeGeneres’ courageous “coming out” episode on her show,
Ellen, which aired in April of 1997, and changed the TV landscape and made other shows
with openly gay characters, such as Will and Grace, acceptable for the mass markets. See,
e.g., Ellen Degeneres Bio, ELLEN: THE ELLEN DEGENERES SHOW, http://ellen.warnerbros.
com/about/bio.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (discussing her character’s coming out epi-
sode, viewed by 46 million viewers, for which Ellen received the Peabody Award as well as
an Emmy Award for writing).  Today, there are several shows both on cable and network
TV portraying LGBT characters; there is even a TV channel specifically dedicated to
LGBT issues, called LOGO.  About Logo, LOGO, http://www.logotv.com/about/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2011). There have been various recent TV shows portraying gays and lesbians
on television, reflecting “some improvement in the representation of gays and lesbians” on
network television. Representations of Gay and Lesbians on Television, MEDIA AWARE-
NESS NETWORK, http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/issues/stereotyping/gays_and_les-
bians/gay_television.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).  This trend “illustrates that networks
are willing to feature gay characters, as long as the shows draw high ratings, and generate
profits for advertisers.” Id.
Over the past two decades, the “[i]ncreasingly fair, accurate and inclusive news media
coverage has played an important role in expanding public awareness and understanding
of . . . LGBT lives.” GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION (GLAAD), ME-
DIA REFERENCE GUIDE 4 (8th ed. 2010), available at http://www.glaad.org/files/
MediaReferenceGuide2010.pdf.  In an increasingly diverse society, the media coverage of
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In a social climate that is seemingly conducive to peaceful coexistence,
increasing numbers of LGBT bravely abandon their closets, and choose
to live their lives cover-free.4  Regrettably, like other minorities, LGBT
are routinely denied equal treatment for refusal to downplay “their stig-
matized identities to get along in life.”5  Taking a quick survey of the
recent media coverage with regard to legal controversies involving LGBT
proves that the rights of sexual minorities remain a hotly contested topic.6
LGBT has moved beyond the simplistic dichotomy of the “pro-gay”/“anti-gay” perception,
and “[i]n an era when . . . LGBT lives increasingly intersect with mainstream media cover-
age of . . . [a] myriad of issues,” GLAAD is committed to providing necessary resources
and statistics to journalists in order to facilitate a fair and accurate portrayal of the LGBT
community. Id.
4. But see YOSHINO, supra note 1.  The author calls for a critical approach to the
renaissance of assimilation in the United States.  Id.  He reasons that “we must be willing
to see the dark side of assimilation, and specifically of covering, which is the most wide-
spread form of assimilation required of us today.” Id.
5. For an interesting discussion of public figures that engaged in covering to advance
their careers, including Martin Sheen and Ben Kingsley who changed their names to cover
their ethnic backgrounds see YOSHINO, supra note 1, at ix–x.
6. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, What the Gay Marriage News Means for You, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/what-the-gay-marriage-
news-means-for-you/.  “On Wednesday [February 23, 2011] President Obama directed the
Justice Department to stop defending the law that bans federal recognition of same-sex
marriages.” Id.  However:
[T]he move doesn’t actually repeal the so-called Defense of Marriage Act.  So same-
sex couples will still remain strangers, for the most part in the eyes of the federal
government. Couples will still be unable to jointly file their federal tax returns, and
they won’t be eligible to receive Social Security benefits based on their spouse’s earn-
ings record.
Id.  For a discussion of the history of the controversial Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
in the context of Obama administration’s position, see David G. Savage & James Oliphant,
Obama Administration Shifts Legal Stance on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/23/nation/la-na-obama-gay-marriage-20110224.  “Dur-
ing the Clinton administration, a Republican-led Congress passed the Defense of Marriage
Act to prevent . . . states’ adoption of gay marriage from spreading nationwide.” Id.  De-
spite the states’ obligation to recognize legal agreements from other states, including mar-
riage (pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause), Congress decided that “neither the
states nor the federal government were obligated to recognize a marriage other than ‘a
legal union between one man and one woman.’” Id. See Kevin Cathcart, Asking and Tell-
ing Since 1975, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/kevin-cathcart/asking-and-telling-since-_b_799668.html (discussing the final decision
by the Senate on December 18, 2010 following the House’s decision to repeal the Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell law, which, for decades, has perpetuated discrimination against lesbian,
gay, and bisexual service members).  The repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell allows LGBT
service members the ability to now live openly, without cover.  Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Re-
peal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, § 2, 124 Stat. 3515 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654
note). For more discussion about the effets of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell see generally, Debra
A. Luker, Comment, The Homosexual Law and Policy in the Military “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harrass . . . Don’t be Absurd!, 3 SCHOLAR 267 (2001).
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In a world marked by so-called “progress,” LGBT, and most notably gay
men and lesbians,7 remain second-class citizens in vital ways.8  Thus, as
long as homosexuals are ordered to sit in the back of the bus, we as soci-
ety (collectively in the driver seat) ought to recognize that sexual minori-
ties require a legally protected status.9  The United States Constitution
7. The claims in this Note will relate to all sexual minorities (LGBT), but I will often
use references to gay men and lesbians, as the discrimination against these particular
groups is the most cited in references used for this Note.
8. CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002).
[Coming out in] the 1970s (and 1980s and 1990s) . . . was the major challenge facing
most lesbians and gay men in America in their personal and public lives  Although the
media depicted a growing openness toward homosexuality in American society, this
did not easily translate into the daily lives of individual lesbians and gay men.  Overall
their connection to any larger sense of a lesbian and gay community was tenuous at
best.
FRED FEJES, GAY RIGHTS AND MORAL PANIC: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S DEBATE ON
HOMOSEXUALITY 7 (2008).
[T]here is, regrettably, a significant history of purposeful discrimination against gay
and lesbian people, by governmental as well as private entities, based on prejudice and
stereotypes that continue to have ramifications today.  Indeed, until very recently
states have “demean[ed] the[ ] . . . existence” of gay and lesbians “by making their
private sexual conduct a crime.”
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder] (alteration in original) (citing Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
9. On February 23, 2011 President Obama declared the Defense of Marriage Act of
1996 (DOMA), which prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages, to be unconstitu-
tional.  Consequently, President Obama instructed the Department of Justice to stop de-
fending its constitutionality.  Siegel Bernard, supra note 6.  Eric H. Holder, the U.S.
Attorney General, announced President Obama’s recommendations in a letter directed to
the members of Congress:
After careful consideration, including a review of my recommendation, the Presi-
dent has concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of
discrimination [immutability, lack of political power, and the trait’s lack of bearing on
legitimate policy objections], classifications based on sexual orientation should be sub-
ject to a more heightened standard of scrutiny.  The President has also concluded that
Section 3 of DOMA [defining marriage for federal purposes as only between a man
and a woman], as applied to legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet the stan-
dard and is therefore unconstitutional. . . .
. . . .
Much of the legal landscape has changed in the [fifteen] years since Congress passed
DOMA.  The Supreme Court has ruled that laws criminalizing homosexual conduct
are unconstitutional.  Congress has repealed the Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell pol-
icy.  Several lower courts have ruled DOMA itself to be unconstitutional.  [However,]
Section 3 of DOMA will continue to remain in effect unless Congress repeals it or
there is a final judicial finding that strikes it down, and the President has informed me
that the Executive Branch will continue to enforce the law.
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seems like the most obvious and perfectly suited refuge to guarantee
rights to personal privacy, equal protection, and due process.  Although
an in-depth constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, the
existing line of jurisprudence on the subject of gay rights reflects a deep
divide, abundant in bias and prejudice.10  Therefore, we must look be-
yond the judiciary for a solution to curtail LGBT discrimination.
Recent developments, in particular President Obama’s official state-
ment declaring the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional,
are promising but limited in scope.11  Although the Obama administra-
tion is helping to build the political momentum against DOMA,12 the Act
remains enforceable law.13  Thus, same-sex partners who are legally mar-
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving
the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2011/February/11-ag-222.html.
10. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UN-
DERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 3
(1999) (discussing how the class-based approach of equal protection jurisprudence denies
justice to gays and lesbians because they are regarded as a “minimally protected class”).
While Romer produced a narrow victory for gays and lesbians, it failed to produce a princi-
ple which could be relied on by future litigants. GERSTMANN, supra at 10.  To remedy the
disparate treatment of the courts, Gerstmann calls for reformation of the Equal Protection
Doctrine from the class- to the rights-based system to ensure democratic process and limit
judicial capacity. Id. at 14, 17.
The debate over gay and lesbian rights, although important in and of itself, reveals far-
reaching contradictions and difficulties with how we conceive of constitutional and
civil rights.  The question now is whether we respond to these difficulties by accusing
one another of bigotry or of seeking special rights, or whether we work together to
create a nation in which we can all live under the equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 181; see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History,
79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1551–53 (1993) (discussing the legal history of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgendered litigation pre-Hardwick, and providing post-Hardwick implications).
One author focuses on “the roles of a positive emotion, love—and a procedural method of
proof—science—in the shaping of laws defining the rights of sexual minorities,” based on
the legal scholarship of Professor Martha Nussbaum, which promoted  principles of equal
dignity and respect to all members of the society.  Nancy Levitt, Theorizing & Litigating
the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 21–22 (2010).
11. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 9; Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal
Act § 2.
12. See E.J. Graff, Is DOMA Dead?, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2011, http://www.thena-
tion.com/article/158862/doma-dead (discussing practical implications of the Obama admin-
istration’s stand on DOMA and stating that eventually “[t]he clear moral and legal
determination will reverberate throughout the law”); Holder, supra note 8 (explaining that
“while both wisdom and the legality of Section 3 of DOMA will continue to be the subject
of both extensive litigation and public debate, this Administration will no longer assert its
constitutionality in court”).
13. See Holder, supra note 8 (recognizing the still-valid authority of Section 3, despite
concluding that it is “unconstitutional”).
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ried in their home states still remain single “for the purposes of taxes,
Social Security benefits, immigration, and all other federal legal mat-
ters.”14  Also, it is rather impractical for sexual minorities to march on
Washington whenever they want to be employed, marry, adopt children,
decide on estate planning and medical directives, preserve their dignity,
or simply hold the hand of their dying partners.
This Note examines the inadequacy of legal remedies available to sex-
ual minorities in medical emergencies based on a discussion of four se-
lected cases.  The analysis of these cases reveals that regardless of
whether in conformity or defiance of the closeted existence, the families
involved in these medical emergencies suffered harmful consequences
imposed by the societal covering demands.  In search of a solution, this
Note analogizes LGBT with other stigmatized groups, namely minorities
based on race or gender.  This Note proposes a comprehensive legislative
act to guarantee LGBT protective status, which would help to minimize
and eventually abrogate the LGBT need to “cover” in order to live their
lives.15  As such, this Note is divided into five parts.
[T]he President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be enforced by the
Executive Branch.  To that end, the President has instructed Executive agencies to
continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive’s obliga-
tion to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals
Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s constitu-
tionality.  This course of action respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted
DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims
raised.
Id.
14. See Graff, supra note 12.
15. See MORRIS B. KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE
POLITICS OF DESIRE 14, 16–17 (1997).  The author explores the relationship between les-
bian and gay rights, federal law, and the role of states in civil rights protections. Id. at 14.
Because these competing interests often conflict, it is necessary to define “the divergent
strands of a movement for lesbian and gay rights,” which includes three categories of
claims: “1) decriminalization of homosexual activities between consenting adults; 2) the
prohibition against lesbians and gays in employment, housing, education, and public ac-
commodations; and 3) the legal and social recognition of the ethical status of lesbian and
gay relationships and community institutions.” Id.  Particularly, the third group of claims
reveals the “the political and philosophical heart of the movement for lesbian and gay
rights.” Id. at 17.
At issue is the demand for the recognition and respect of lesbian and gay relationships
and institutions within the broader legal, social and ethical context. . . .  The rights in
question are not simply those of individuals, but of couples, families, and voluntary
associations.  Ultimately, what is at stake is the moral legitimacy and ethical validity of
lesbian and gay ways of life.
Id. at 16. But see YOSHINO, supra note 1, at 194 (offering an alternative solution to seeking
legal recourse to achieve equality for LGBT).
2011] MEDICAL CRISIS 453
Part II discusses the case of Langbehn v. Public Health Trust of Miami-
Dade County.16  This tragic case involved Lisa Marie Pond, a lesbian
mother, whose partner and three adopted children (Langbehn-Pond fam-
ily) were denied access to her by the hospital staff, during the last hours
of her life, in spite of properly executed medical directives.  Janice
Langbehn lost the court case against the hospital, which was based on a
state negligence claim.  However, due to the public nature of the case,
President Obama directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to amend the federal HHS guidelines to include same-sex part-
ners among those granted visitation rights in federally-funded medical fa-
cilities (through Medicare and Medicaid programs).17  This Note argues
that this partial remedy, as commendable as it may be, cannot curtail the
type of discrimination experienced by the Langbehn-Pond family, be-
cause such bias is an example of a systemic problem in the way our soci-
ety views and holds prejudice against sexual minorities.
Part III focuses on three other cases, encompassing three decades of
discrimination against same-sex couples who, like the Langbehn-Pond
family, experienced grave prejudice and lacked adequate legal remedies.
In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski18 involved a deeply closeted
couple living in a rural area, who did not execute legal documents that
could have validated each partner’s rights in the event of a medical emer-
gency.19  For over a decade Karen Thompson was repeatedly denied
I am troubled that Americans seem increasingly to turn toward the law to do the work
of civil rights precisely when they should be turning away from it.  The real solution
lies in all of us as citizens, not in the tiny subset of us who are lawyers.  People who are
not lawyers should have reason-forcing conversations outside the law.  They should
pull Goffman’s term “covering” outside of academic obscurity and press it into the
popular lexicon. . . .  People confronted with demands to cover should feel embold-
ened to seek a reason for that demand, even if the law does not reach the actors
making the demand, or recognize the group burdened by it.
Id.
16. 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
17. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482, 485 (effective on Jan. 18, 2011).  The regulation is formally titled,
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Changes to the Hospital and Critical Care Access Hospi-
tal Conditions of Participation to Ensure Visitation Rights for All Patients.
18. 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
19. See CASEY CHARLES, THE SHARON KOWALSKI CASE: LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS
ON TRIAL 8–9 (2003) (discussing the political and social landscape during the time the case
was filed and points out that in 1983, “social theories of homosexuality were shifting from
notions of sin and sickness to conceptions of neutral difference, social construction, and
genetics”). Id.  Although the case had little legal significance outside of Minnesota,
“Thompson’s petition in 1991 has become a touchstone for legal reformers in areas of
custody law, same-sex marriage litigation, and domestic partnership litigation.” Id. at 9.
For a detailed discussion of the case, see KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE ANDRZEJEWSKI,
WHY CAN’T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? (1988). See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two
Real Men Eat Quiche Together?  Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protec-
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guardianship of her girlfriend Sharon, a cognitively-impaired paraplegic,
injured and paralyzed as a result of a car accident.20  Also discussed in
Part III are Flanigan v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.21
and Reed v. AMN Healthcare,22 which involve same-sex couples living
openly.  In both cases, Bill Flanigan and Sharon Reed were barred by
hospital staff from making medical decisions and visiting their life part-
ners shortly before their deaths.23  Because these cases involve the rights
of both closeted and openly gay couples, with and without advance medi-
cal directives, this Note concludes that the discrimination against LGBT
is so widespread and comprehensive that documents are not the magic
panacea.
Part IV shifts to a general discussion of the inadequacy of legal reme-
dies available to LGBT and offers a federal legislation as a remedy.  This
Note proposes a comprehensive federal act, analogous to the Civil Rights
Act,24 which would provide an umbrella of protection for sexual minori-
ties.  Legislative protection similar to that received by other identity-
based groups, namely racial and gender minorities (females), will allow
the LGBT community to continue to gain much needed legitimacy of
their claims.25  Furthermore, drawing analogies of experiences with other
tion for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1991) (explaining that the
Kowalski case is the most notorious example of legal dispute demonstrating “gay men and
lesbians. . . lack [of] legal standing to make decisions for an incapacitated partner” when
conflicts with blood relatives arise). Id. at 581.  “The Kowalski affair . . . reflect[s] our
society’s unabating refusal to acknowledge or accept gay relationships.  The state does not
forbid two lesbians from living together or raising children together; it merely denies them
the benefits that would require it to publicly recognize the relationship.” Id. at 583;
Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 883, 895–97 (1988) (discussing the Kowalski case in the context of same-sex part-
ners’ necessity for medical power of attorney).
20. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
21. Complaint, Flanigan v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. (No. 24-c-02-001289) (Md.
Cir. Ct. Balt., Feb. 27, 2007) available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legal-docs/
flanigan_md_20020205_complaint-circuit-court-for-baltimore-city.html [hereafter Flanigan
Complaint].
22. 225 P.3d 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
23. Reed v. AMN Healthcare, 225 P.3d 1012, 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); Flanigan
Complaint, supra note 21, at 2.
24. Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2006)) (stating the intent of the act is “[t]o protect all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication”).
25. But see RIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 155–56 (explaining how the rights-based
perspective of the gay rights movement fails to remedy all social inequalities).
[The] narrow, rights-based perspective, rooted in identity politics, has largely been
unquestioned by the mainstream contemporary lesbian and gay movements, especially
those that dominate politics at the national level.  But this perspective, in and of itself,
is far too limiting, as it often ignores the economic and social inequities that provide
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oppressed groups will emphasize the universal nature of discrimination,
which centers around a specific trait shared by the members of the
group.26  This Note argues that, based on the experience of other minori-
ties, a uniform act is more effective than piecemeal legislation, because it
brings into focus the inequality of treatment shared by the minority,
which can lead not only to social changes, but also to revamped attitudes.
The conclusion suggests that, like other protected minorities, members
of the LGBT community share a longstanding and comprehensive history
of discrimination and social stigmatization.27  Because of the continuing
opportunities for coalition building across class, racial, gender, and workplace divides.
It also fails to provide an effective challenge to the Christian Right’s vast organizing
efforts.
Id. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 421, 425 (2001).
[T]he new social movements of the late twentieth century sought to change the status
of marginalized groups.  Theirs was a politics of recognition. For these civil rights,
women’s movements, pro-choice, gay liberation, . . . the core goal was to force society
to recognize the movements constituents as equal citizens and persons who were just
as worthy as the social norm, namely the [W]hite heterosexual male.
Id.; See William N. Eskridge Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner’s Sex & Rea-
son: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 384 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge,
A Social Constructionist Critique] (highlighting that government is “potentially important”
to support bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians against social oppression).
Just as feminists have called upon the government to fight violence against women in
the home and harassment and discrimination in the workplace, so those of us who
fight for gay liberation should be calling upon the government to fight social oppres-
sion against us [LGBT], through antidiscrimination statutes, hate crime laws, and sex
education programs.
Id.
26. See RIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 155 (explaining the effect of drawing analogies
to other minority groups); ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY 2 (2d prtg. 1964), Goffman states that:
Society establishes the means of categorizing persons. . . . When a stranger comes
into our presence, then, first appearances are likely to enable us to anticipate his cate-
gory and attributes, his “social identity . . . .”
We lean on these anticipations that we have, transforming them into normative ex-
pectations, into righteously presented demands. . . .
While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of . . . his possessing an
attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for
him to be, and of a less desirable kind. . . .  He is thus reduced in our minds from a
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.  Such an attribute is a stigma,
especially when its discrediting effect is very extensive. . . .  [However] . . . not all
undesirable attributes are at issue, but only those which are incongruous with our
stereotype of what a given type of individual should be.
GOFFMAN, supra at 2–3.
27. See FEJES, supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that gays and lesbians, like other minori-
ties, were subjected to discriminatory local, state, and federal laws and policies).  However,
“[l]esbians and gays never found strong advocates in the government, as did the other
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societal demands to cover imposed on sexual minorities, evidenced by the
cases of grave prejudice experienced by same-sex couples in medical
emergencies discussed in this Note, the group cannot rise above the iden-
tity based on trait that defines it.  Thus, a comprehensive legislation
prohibiting discrimination against LGBT is needed to first ensure equal
treatment, and then to facilitate societal changes in attitudes towards sex-
ual minorities.  For as long as the law does not prohibit the conduct that
forces LGBT to assimilate or risk being accused of “flaunting” their sexu-
ality by simply living their lives,28 we perpetuate the debilitating covers
that prevent us from seeing who we really are.  The ultimate challenge is
to rise above people’s sexual identities while maintaining respect for
those identities.29
groups, and the logic of client politics never extended to them.” Id. at 6. See Eskridge, A
Social Constructionist Critique, supra note 25, at 383, 426 (discussing legalized discrimina-
tion after World War II as the time during which many minorities, including homosexuals,
were categorized and privileged or deprived rights based on various identifying traits).
28. Cf. Fajer, supra note 19, at 570–75 (discussing how lesbians and gays must be able
to live their lives publicly to the same extent as heterosexuals).  In general, relationships
are public in nature because a couple that is in love wants to live life together; this some-
times—even inadvertently—confirms to the world that they share a romantic involvement.
See id. at 575.  In addition, “[m]ost discrimination, particularly by private individuals or
business entities, is not directed at private behavior, but at some type of public behavior or
speech that acknowledges and calls attention to a person’s gay sexual orientation.” Id. at
570.  Consequently, same-sex couples experience significant discrimination, which can only
be countered by extending to lesbians and gay men “the right to carry on . . . [their] lives in
public to the same extent as anyone else [who is heterosexual].” Id: see also CHARLES,
supra note 19, at 7.
Lesbians and gays must get out more in every geography, not passing as assimilated
and normal humans, not just feeling to the havens of urban ghettos, but also celebrat-
ing their own cultural and social heritage of same-sex love while demanding freedom
from state-sanctioned intolerance.  The struggle for a queer-accessible world involves
not only filing lawsuits, . . . but also building social and cultural bridges through acts as
simple as introducing partners or holding hands on Main Street.
CHARLES, supra note 19, at 7.
29. See RIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 17; Eskridge, A Social Constructionist Critique,
supra note 25 (offering a comprehensive approach to end discrimination against LGBT
and to implement societal changes).
If we want to break down anti[-]homosexual attitudes in American society . . . [w]e
must draw upon gay and lesbian history, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, sexol-
ogy, and literature, as well as the more standard legal sources, to reveal
that . . . [LGBT] communities are worthy contributors to America’s pluralism and
should be accorded the same equal and dignified treatment accorded other communi-
ties.  This positive case rests more on narrative than on argumentation: we must bring
our personal stories and histories to the attention of law and society.  Narratives can
rectify stereotypical misconceptions about us and can educate society about our legiti-
mate concerns, needs, and the unjustified ways social mores and policies hurt us.
Eskridge, A Social Constructionist Critique, supra note at 25.
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II. LANGBEHN-POND FAMILY
A. The Tragic Story of Janice and Lisa
It began as a rather ordinary story.  On February 17, 2007, a family of
two parents and three of their four adopted children departed Seattle,
Washington to travel to Miami, Florida for a family cruise.30  The next
day they boarded the ship, the children happily anticipating a tropical
family vacation; however, right before the ship left the port, their mother,
Lisa Marie Pond, fell ill and collapsed on the deck.31  Still conscious, Lisa
was rushed by ambulance to Ryder Trauma Center at Miami’s Jackson
Memorial Hospital and was admitted at approximately 3:30 in the after-
noon.32  Her family arrived at the hospital soon after, and that is when
the family’s harrowing ordeal began.
Up to this point, the Langbehn-Pond family seemed just like any other
family; however there was one difference, and the hospital staff would
make it very clear that the difference mattered.  Lisa Marie’s spouse and
co-parent of their four adopted children was Janice Langbehn, another
woman.33  At the hospital, Janice immediately informed the admitting
clerk “that she was Lisa Marie’s life partner,” and that she would like to
receive any relevant medical information and updates regarding Lisa
Marie’s condition.34  Janice also explained that the children were legally
adopted by the couple and requested that she be at her partner’s side.35
She also spoke to the social worker, who stated that Janice’s requests for
information and for access to Lisa Marie would likely be ignored because
she was “in an ‘anti-gay city and state.’”36  Furthermore, because of the
30. Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 10, Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of
Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 08-21813-CIV (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29 2008) (dismissed); Janice
Langbehn, Family Trauma, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 9, 2007, available at http://www.thefree-
library.com/Family+trauma%3a+when+her+partner+was+rushed+to+the+hospital+
with . . . -a0169412887.
31. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 10–11; Langbehn, supra note 30 (relaying
the narrative of Janice Langbehn, life-partner of Lisa Marie Pond).  “For months, each of
us had been dreaming of white sandy beaches and blue waters and spending some much
needed vacation time together as a family.” Id.
32. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 10–11.
33. Id. at 9 (stating that Lisa Marie and Janice Langbehn had been life partners since
1987).  Lisa Marie and Janice were “involved in a monogamous, romantic, and emotionally
and financially dependent relationship since shortly after their meeting . . . .” Id.  In 1991
they celebrated their relationship in a commitment ceremony and holy union at Tacoma
Community Church. Id.  Since 1992, Lisa Marie and Janice served as foster parents to a
total of twenty-two children with “‘special needs’ who were considered hard to place.” Id.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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holiday weekend, it would not be several days before Janice could appear
before the court in order to qualify her legal rights.37  Janice informed the
social worker that Lisa Marie had executed a power of attorney and ad-
vance medical directives authorizing Janice to act on her behalf in an
event of incapacity.38  The records indicate that the hospital received
these documents via fax at approximately 4:15 p.m.39  At the same time,
the treating physicians determined that Lisa Marie suffered a burst aneu-
rism.40  Despite receipt of the documentation, the hospital staff never
provided Janice with proper consent forms for her signature to validate
Janice’s status as Lisa Marie’s healthcare surrogate.41  However, the hos-
pital did manage to have Lisa Marie’s father sign the forms authorizing
some of her treatment.42
Over the next seven hours, despite repeated requests and pleas made
to the hospital staff, Janice was given very limited information and access
to her partner.43  In fact, during that time, she was only allowed to see
Lisa Marie once, for five minutes.44  At 6:10 p.m., both of Lisa Marie’s
treating physicians told Janet that her condition had deteriorated and that
surgery was no longer advisable.  Janice informed the doctors that Lisa
Marie was an organ donor and pled with the hospital staff to allow her
and the children to see Lisa Marie.  Unfortunately, Janice and the chil-
dren were denied access to Lisa Marie while they watched other families
escorted into the trauma-restricted area.45  Janice repeated her pleas to
the hospital staff every twenty minutes, and due to the emotional trauma
“You are in an antigay city and state.”  Those were the words of a social worker at
Miami’s Jackson Memorial Hospital as my partner, Lisa, lay dying just steps away in
the trauma center, behind locked doors.  He punched his code on the keyboard and
walked away, leaving me standing in the waiting room with our children—Katie,
David, and Danielle, ages [nine] through [thirteen].  None of us could see her.
Langbehn, supra note 30 (recalling her encounter with the social worker and the treatment
received by her and her children).
37. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 11.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
41. See id. at 1332 (stating that hospital personnel “also did not allow Ms. Langbehn
to receive Ms. Pond’s medical records”).
42. Id.
43. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 13 (stating that at 5:20 p.m. one of the
attending physicians informed Janet that Lisa Marie needed a brain monitor, and Janet
authorized the procedure).
44. Id. (stating that at 6:50 p.m. a Catholic priest, who was called to perform last rites
for Lisa Marie “escorted Janice into the trauma area, where Lisa Marie lay alone in a
trauma bay, and the priest performed last rites.”  Immediately after, at 6:55 p.m., Janice
was escorted back to the waiting area).
45. Id. at 14.
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of this experience, she became ill herself.46  The staff also failed to inform
Janice that Lisa Marie was transferred to another area of the hospital.47
Lisa Marie’s sister and brother-in-law made it to the hospital nearly
half an hour before midnight; upon their arrival, hospital staff notified
them of Lisa Marie’s relocation within the Intensive Care Unit and they
were given her new room number.48  Around midnight, Janice and the
children were finally allowed to see Lisa Marie, who was unconscious.49
The next morning at 10:45 a.m., Lisa Marie was confirmed brain-dead,
and “her heart, kidneys and liver were donated to four patients.”50
B. The Lawsuit
On September 2, 2008, Janice Langbehn with the help of the Lambda
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (Lambda Legal) filed a lawsuit
against Jackson Memorial Hospital, the treating physicians, and the hos-
pital’s social worker.51  Because Langbehn sued for negligence, the
Amended Complaint did not seek damages for the discriminatory treat-
ment experienced by the Langbehn-Pond family at the hospital.52  Thus,
the real issue was kept in the periphery while the lawyers attempted to
46. Id. at 14–15 (stating that Janice suffered stomach ache, nausea, and vomiting while
waiting to see Lisa Marie).
47. Id.
48. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 15.
49. Tara Parker-Pope, Kept From a Dying Partner’s Bedside, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/health/19well.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=
12957.html.
50. Id.
51. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 39 (showing Lambda Legal was included
on the electronic service when the complaint was filed with the Clerk of Court); Tika Mi-
lan, Lambda Legal Sues Florida Hospital for Mistreatment of Deceased Lesbian’s Family,
LAMBDA LEGAL (June 25, 2008), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/fl_20080625_
lambda-sues-fl-hospital.html.
52. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 1–2, 32–33.  In the Summary of the Action,
the Amended Complaint addresses the “anti-gay animus,” but only in context of proving
elements of the negligence claims. Id. at 1–2.  Specifically, paragraph 5 states that “De-
fendants’ cruel and/or substandard treatment was motivated by anti-gay animus, was con-
trary to professional standards of care, and was a breach of Defendants’ duty of reasonable
care, as a consequence of which the Plaintiffs have suffered serious and irreparable injury.”
Id. at 3.  The other allegations of discrimination, based on sexual orientation, are included
in Counts VI and VII, both referring to breaches of fiduciary relationship by the hospital
and the physicians against the Estate of Lisa Marie and Janice, respectively. Id. at 32–33.
Paragraph 130(e) alleges that the physicians breached their fiduciary duties to Lisa Marie
and Janice by “discriminating against Lisa Marie [or Janice] and [her] family based on her
sexual orientation and/or same-sex relationship and familial status in violation of state law,
hospital policies, national standards, medical ethics and/or generally accepted medical
practice.” Id.  In addition, the Factual Background section notes Janice’s encounter with
the social worker at the hospital, who stated that she should not expect to receive any
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frame it only as a negligence claim, as that was the only legal claim
available.
Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss, on which movants
ultimately prevailed.53  In their motion and the subsequent reply, defend-
ants did not even dispute the “anti-gay animus” as the reason for denial
of visitation rights.54  Instead, defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to
state any facts supporting defendants’ wrongdoing, repeatedly calling the
“animus” allegation “conclusory.”55  Defendants also admitted that even
if the social worker made a statement to Janice that she was in an “anti-
gay city and state,” he was bound by § 765.401 of Florida Statutes.56  This
statute, for purposes of informed consent, does not recognize “same sex
life partner[s], regardless of their legal status within another state, as any-
thing other than a ‘close friend,’ the seventh class in order of priority.”57
Furthermore, § 741.212 disallows recognition of same sex marriage in
information regarding Lisa Marie’s condition, since they were in an “anti-gay city and
state.” Id. at 11.
53. Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1347
(S.D. Fla. 2009). (stating that “Counts I-IV are dismissed with prejudice as to the individ-
ual defendants, and are dismissed without prejudice as to the Public Health Trust. Counts
V-VIII are dismissed without prejudice as to all defendants”).
54. Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 18, Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (No. 08-
21813-CIV) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply].  Plaintiffs’ “assumptions” regarding “gay ani-
mus” rest solely on a statement made by the social worker, which was factually accurate
and had no effect on Janice’s involvement in medical decisions regarding Lisa, because the
physicians consulted with Janice even after the social worker made the comment regarding
“anti-gay city and state.” Id.
55. Id. at 29.
Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion of “anti-gay animus,” which is not attributed to any
individual Defendant, and which is unaccompanied by any other fact demonstrating
wrongdoing, simply cannot be enough to haul well-meaning, well-respected, and dedi-
cated health professionals into court and accuse them of intentionally trying to harm
patients and their loved ones on account of sexual orientation. . . .  It is irresponsible
and scandalous insinuation and there will never be facts to support it.
Id.
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (West 2007).  The statute designates order of priority in
cases where the patient is incapacitated or developmentally disabled, without an executed
advance directive or designated surrogate, as follows: (1) judicially appointed guardian; (2)
the patient’s spouse; (3) an adult child of the patient; (4) a parent of the patient; (5) the
adult sibling of the patient; (6) “an adult relative of the patient who has exhibited special
care and concern for the patient”; (7) a close friend of the patient; or (8) a social worker.
Id.
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2007)
Marriage between persons of the same-sex entered into in any other jurisdiction,
whether within or outside the State of Florida, the United States, or any other jurisdic-
tion, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location, or relationships be-
tween persons of the same-sex which are treated as marriages in any jurisdiction,
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Florida “for any purposes.”58  Thus, even if the social worker made the
statement, the statement was accurate under the applicable Florida law.59
The hospital could not interpret “the [second] category of ‘spouse’ in
§ 765.401 as including same-sex partners, even if it wanted to, because
Florida law forbids it.”60  The defendants concluded that the social
worker did not state that either he, or any other hospital staff member,
were gay, thus the court should not hold “that providing accurate infor-
mation about the laws of the state, however unfair those laws may be,
amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct.”61
The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.62  The court
carefully avoided the “gay-animus” issue for the better part of the opin-
ion, referring to it only twice, and completely avoided § 765.401 of the
Florida Statutes.  The court first referenced the anti-gay comments made
by the social worker in a footnote discussing Count V of the Amended
Complaint, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress by the
treating physicians.63  The court concluded that in negligence, the doctors
could not be held responsible for the derogatory comments made by an-
other person, but rather they could only be accountable for their own
tortious acts.64  In conclusion, the physicians’ conduct was neither so ex-
treme nor outrageous to rise to the level of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.65
either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location, are not recognized for any
purpose in this state.
Id.; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint with Prejudice and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 27, Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (No. 08-21813-CIV).
58. § 741.212; Defendants’ Reply, supra note 54, at 27–28 (citations omitted).
59. Defendants’ Reply, supra note 54, at 28.
[E]ven accepting Dr. Frederick’s alleged statement as true, which he must for pur-
poses of this Motion to Dismiss, the alleged statement that Florida and the City of
Miami are “anti-gay,” is an accurate characterization of Florida law in the context of
health care advance directives.  Indeed, Florida is one of only four states that categori-
cally refuse to recognize same-sex marriages from other states.
Id.
60. Id. at 27 (citing § 741.212(3)) (“‘spouse’ applies only to a ‘union between one man
and one woman’”).
61. Id. at 29.
62. Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326.
63. Id. at 1344.
64. Id. at 1344 n.9.
65. Id. at 1344.
There are a number of cases which, though not directly on point, indicate that the
alleged conduct here is not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”
Id.
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The court’s second reference to the alleged discrimination based on
sexual orientation came towards the end of the opinion.  The court stated
that in their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs contradicted their earlier
claim regarding denial of right to make medical decisions on behalf of
Lisa Marie.66  Specifically, the Amended Complaint provided a detailed
timeline acknowledging that the doctors informed Janice of Lisa Marie’s
grave condition, and that Janice provided them with information that Lisa
Marie was an organ donor.67  The court stated that the inclusion (in the
Amended Complaint) of this brief encounter between Janice and Lisa’s
doctors was sufficient to support its conclusion that the physicians did not
violate their fiduciary duties owed to Janice as a healthcare surrogate of
Lisa Marie.68  Janice could not win; first the defendants found her claims
too conclusory and then, when she made a good faith effort to provide
more detailed, truthful information, the court found her statements con-
tradictory.  Keeping with the theme of the negligence-based claims al-
leged in the Amended Complaint, the court held that under Florida law,
the hospital and the physicians had a limited duty to provide medical in-
formation to Janice, but not to the children who lacked capacity to make
any medical decisions on their mother’s behalf.69  Furthermore, even if
the duty to inform extended to children, it was discharged by providing
any update on Lisa Marie’s medical condition to Janice.70
The court avoided deciding the issue of the hospital’s duty to allow
Janice and the children to visit Lisa Marie at her bedside.  Instead, the
court left the decision regarding patient visitations to the discretion of
medical personnel: stating that in certain units, such as the trauma unit,
visitation may create an “unreasonable risks[ ] of harm to the patient or
to the putative visitors . . . establish[ing] a legal duty in tort.”71  In doing
so the court just paid lip service to the principle of deferring to hospital
and medical expertise.
The court concluded there was no physical impact to support Janice’s
claims with regard to Lisa Marie, because medical records did not sup-
port such a conclusion and Janice did not allege malpractice against the
66. Id. at 1346–47.
67. Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1346–47.
68. Id. at 1347 (“ . . . [T]he more specific factual allegations in the amended complaint,
which govern over more general ones, demonstrate beyond any doubt that Ms. Langbehn
was not denied the right to make any medical decisions on behalf of Ms. Pond.”).
69. Id. at 1326.
70. Id. at 1336.
71. Id. at 1338 (stating that “absent contrary directive by the Florida courts or the
legislature, decisions as to visitation should be left to the medical personnel in charge of
the patient, without, second guessing by juries and courts”).
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hospital.72  The complaint also failed to allege any physical injuries suf-
fered by the children as a consequence of the alleged psychological
trauma.73  The court, however, upheld Janice’s claim as “somewhat thin,”
but nonetheless sufficient to comply with the impact rule.74
Finally, the court acknowledged the hospital’s lack of sensitivity and
attention towards the Langbehn-Pond family, which resulted in “needless
distress during a time of anguish and vulnerability.”75  However, the hos-
pital’s failure to provide Janice with “frequent updates” and to allow her
and the children to visit Lisa Marie, although regrettable, as plead in the
allegations in the Amended Complaint did not state a claim for which
relief could be granted.76  Although the court allowed a second amend-
ment to the complaint, it was not filed by the required deadline.77
C. Obama to the Rescue
Although Lambda Legal lost the case it had filed against the hospital
on behalf of Janice Langbehn, the case created enough publicity to attract
the attention of the White House.78  In fact, one may speculate that
Lambda Legal filed the suit—and many others similar suits around the
country—hoping to generate the publicity necessary to eventually prompt
policy changes.79  One may say that sexual minorities in desperate times
72. Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1336,
1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009).  “The psychological trauma ‘must cause a demonstrable physical
injury such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or similarly objectively discernible
physical impairment before a cause of action may exist . . . there is no cause of action for
psychological trauma alone when resulting from simple negligence.” Id. at 1336.
73. Id. at 1341.  “The [Amended] [C]omplaint does allege in Count II that the chil-
dren have suffered ‘physical injury,’ but allegation is conclusory, lacks any factual nexus,
and is devoid of any supporting facts so as to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1347.
76. Id.  “Unfortunately, no relief is available under Florida law for these failures
based on the allegations pled in the amended complaint.” Id. Thus, “the law does not
provide a remedy for every wrong.” Id.
77. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 24, Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (No. 08-
21813) (stipulating the filing deadline as October 16, 2009).
78. See Presidential Memo on Healthcare: Cathcart says, “This Is How Change Hap-
pens.”, LAMBDA LEGAL (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/ny_201004
16_presidential-memo.html [hereinafter LAMBDA LEGAL, Cathcart] (discussing the policy
changes that will be implemented to address health care issues and hospital visitation in
regard to LGBT families).  Kevin Cathcart, Executive Director of Lambda Legal, stated
that Lambda “[t]ogether with Janice, . . . raised the issue and opened it up for public discus-
sion.” Id. As a result, “the President heard it and acted.  When you stand up for what is
right, you build toward the day when change is made.  Lambda Legal and Janice never
gave up fighting.” Id.
79. See In Court, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2011) (providing basic information about Lamda Legal).  For almost forty years,
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undertake desperate measures.  Furthermore, the success of activism in
the Kowalski case,80 a notorious battle involving same-sex couples’ rights,
proved how minorities can utilize the power of media to further their
agenda.81
After a succession of New York Times articles and other media cover-
age of the Langbehn case against the hospital, on April 15, 2010, Presi-
dent Obama issued a memorandum to Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services specifically titled: Respecting the Rights of
Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision
Makers for Medical Emergencies.82  This memorandum stated:
There are few moments in our lives that call for greater compassions
and companionship than when a loved one is admitted to the hospi-
tal.  In these hours of need and moments of pain and anxiety, all of
us would hope to have a hand to hold, a shoulder on which to lean –
a loved one to be there for us, as we would be there for them.83
Lambda Legal has worked on behalf of LGBT right, litigating around sixty-five cases per
year. Id. The organization chooses its cases “by analyzing them to see which will have the
greatest impact in protecting and advancing the rights of LGBT people . . . .” Id.
80. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Kowalski case).
81. See In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.
lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/in-re-guardianship-of-sharon.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2011) (summarizing the amicus brief that Lamda Legal and several other LGBT groups
filed in In re Kowalski on August 21, 1991). See also CHARLES, supra note 19, at 15 ex-
plaining that “[t]he Kowalski case put a face on lesbian and gay discrimination”); Fajer,
supra note 19 at 582 (emphasizing that “[d]uring the court battles over guardianship and
visitation, the Kowalskis consistently denied that their daughter was in a lesbian relation-
ship”).  They claimed, implausibly, that Thompson had made up the story and risked the
discrimination that attended her coming out to profit herself and advance the cause of gay
rights. Id. See also Rivera, supra note 19, at 896 n.80 (stating that “Karen Thompson has
taken her battle to care for her lover Sharon to the national media,” and as a result,
“[g]rassroot support and fundraising groups have sprung up across the [United States]”).
82. See Tara Parker-Pope, For Same-Sex Couples, Equality in the Hospital, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/for-same-sex-couples-
equality-in-the-hospital/?scp=1&sq=for%20same-sex%20couples%20equality%20in%20
hospital&st=cse (discussing President Obama’s memorandum to Kathleen Sebelius that
was partially prompted by the Langbehn-Pond case); Tara Parker-Pope, No Visiting Rights
for Hospital Trauma Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/09/30/no-visiting-rights-for-hospital-patients/?html (discussing the dismissal of the
lawsuit in the Langbhen-Pond case).  Beth Littrell, the Lambda Legal lawyer who repre-
sented Janice Langbehn, stated that “there was no medical or legitimate reason to deny the
family access to her [Lisa Marie’s] bedside.  The court’s decision paints a tragically stark
picture of how vulnerable same-sex couples and their families are during times of crisis.”
Id.
83. Memorandum on Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors
and to Designate Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 FR 20511 (Apr.
15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memoran-
dum-hospital-visitation; [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum]; President Obama Issues
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The memorandum addressed issues of visitation rights of various
groups, who do not fit within traditionally defined categories.  It specifi-
cally discussed visitation rights of gay and lesbian Americans “barred
from the bedsides of the partners with whom they may have spent de-
cades of their lives.”84  Although the memorandum addressed only feder-
ally funded facilities that participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs,
it was an important first step to address inequalities in treatment of
LGBT in medical emergencies.  Furthering the publicity, President
Obama personally called Janice Langbehn from Air Force One to express
his sympathy for the tragic loss of her partner and for the outrageous
treatment she suffered.85  Janice was also invited to the White House “in
recognition of her tireless advocacy beginning in a Florida hospital over
three years ago.”86  While the Obama memorandum was advisory in na-
ture, designed to provide guidelines for the legislature (not enforceable
Memo on LGBT Health Issues; Calls Janice Langbehn from Air Force One, LAMBDA LE-
GAL (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/us_20100415_president-obama-
issues-memo-on-lgbt-health-issues.html [hereinafter LAMBDA LEGAL, Langbehn].
The steps that President Obama outlined tonight are a great leap forward in address-
ing discrimination affecting LGBT patients and their families . . . .  These measures are
intended to ensure that no family will have to experience what the Langbehn-Pond
family did that night at Jackson Memorial Hospital.  We are so proud of Janice and her
family – she stood up and told her story and it made a difference.
Id. See also LAMBDA LEGAL, Cathcart, supra note 78 (discussing the presidential memo on
hospital visitation for same-sex couples).
84. Presidential Memorandum, supra note 83 (requesting that healthcare providers to
take various measures to provide patients with compassionate and equal treatment).
By this memorandum, I request that you take the following steps: 1. Initiate appropri-
ate rulemaking, pursuant to your authority under 42 U.S.C. 1395x and other relevant
provisions of law, to ensure that hospitals that participate in Medicare or Medicaid
respect the rights of patients to designate visitors. It should be made very clear that
designated visitors, including individuals designated by legally valid advance directives
(such as durable powers of attorney and health care proxies), should enjoy visitation
privileges that are no more restrictive than those that immediate family members enjoy.
You should also provide that participating hospitals may not deny visitation privileges
on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability.  The rulemaking should take into account the need for hospitals
to restrict visitation in medically appropriate circumstances as well as the clinical deci-
sions that medical professionals make about a patient’s care or treatment.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. LAMBDA LEGAL, Cathcart, supra note 78.  The “[p]resident direct[ed] Health and
Human Services to report in 180 days with additional recommendations about actions it
can take to address hospital visitation, medical decision-making and other health care is-
sues that affect LGBT patients and their families.” Id.
86. Lambda Legal Client Janice Langbehn to Attend White House Pride Event,
LAMBDA LEGAL (June 21, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/us_20100621_
langbehn-to-attend.html (quoting Kevin Cathcart, Executive Director for Lambda Legal).
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procedurally nor substantively), it indeed sent a message and provided a
framework for the law.
On August 27, 2010, Lambda Legal, along with the Gay and Lesbian
Medical Association, and the National Health Law Program, filed a
twenty-six page memorandum with comments in response to the pro-
posed guidelines, published in June by the Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services, within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).87  After a careful review, Tara Borelli, the staff attorney for
Lambda Legal, found the guidelines were a good starting point.  How-
ever, one major problem, which was not addressed, was the uncertainty
of patient rights when he or she is incapacitated and unable to designate
the visitors or decision makers.88  Other recommendations made to HHS
included: (1) requirement for documentation reflecting patient-visitor re-
lationship should be minimal and not discriminatory towards LGBT; (2)
the visitations provisions for hospice and nursing home facilities should
include explicit non-discrimination language to protect LGBT; (3) the fa-
87. Letter from Lambda Legal, GLMA, & NHeLP, to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Srvs., (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Letter] (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review
on Minority Issues) (the letter was jointly written by Lambda Legal, the Gay & Lesbian
Medical Association, and the National Health Law Program).
In many states there is limited legal recourse when LGBT patients and their families
are mistreated by health professionals, and litigating such cases always is emotionally
wrenching.  As a result, few such cases have been brought and even fewer suc-
ceeded––underscoring further the need for these Proposed Rules to provide meaning-
ful protections.  While advance directives sometimes help, private documents alone
are not adequate protection, as demonstrated by the Langbehn and Flanigan
cases. . . .  Given the obvious need for greater national uniformity and certainty for
patients, and for health care providers and organizations, these Proposed Rules do
promise improvement by clearly prohibiting discrimination, and by underscoring the
seriousness of the need for change by wielding a powerful enforcement policy.
Id. at 4. For a further discussion of the suggestions made to Health & Human Services see
Lambda Legal, GLMA, NHeLP on Hospital Visitation Guidelines for LGBT Patients: “A
Good Start, But Important Clarifications Are Needed”, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/dc_20100827_lambda-glma-nhelp.html.  To see the full
text of the final guidelines that became effective on January 18, 2011 see 42 C.F.R. § 482
(2010).
88. Letter, supra note 87, at 13–14.
The Proposed Rules are silent regarding the circumstance in which LGBT patients
and their families are perhaps most vulnerable–when a patient is incapacitated and
has not previously designated in writing a health care agent or representative.  LGBT
patients far too often experience discriminatory visitation denials even when they have
designated an agent in writing, and patients who have not done so––a common cir-
cumstance––are even more vulnerable.
Id.  Thus, visitation rights “should be allowed for any person who plays a significant role in
the patient’s life.” Id. at 14.  And “the Proposed Rules should make expressly clear that a
person with whom the patient is in an adult domestic relationship formally recognized under
the laws of any state or municipal government should be permitted to visit.” Id. at 15.
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cilities should provide patients with clear notice of their practices and
procedures regarding visitation rights and standards; and (4) and there
must be a process for denial of visitation rights.89  The comment letter
also provided a brief history of discrimination experienced by LGBT peo-
ple in medical emergencies, referring specifically to the Langbehn and
Flanigan cases as prime examples of anti-gay bias amongst hospital
staff.90  It was noted that such biases arose even in situations where
couples had durable health care powers of attorney.91
The proposed guidelines were codified and became effective on Janu-
ary 18, 2011.92  The regulations require the hospitals participating in
Medicare and Medicaid programs to have written policies and procedures
regarding patients’ visitations rights, and to inform patients and visitors of
their rights.93  They also explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation.94  However, these rules, now in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, does not include the recommendations made by Lambda Legal.
Specifically, it omits procedures for situations in which the patient is inca-
pacitated and unable to designate visitors and proxies, and it does not set
forth appeal procedures for denial of visitation rights.95
Once again, the victory in the fight for equality was only partial. And
once again, it required a very public campaign.  This was not a complete
solution, but it moved the cause forward.  In addition, Janice’s courage
89. Id. at 13–15 (outlining these recommendations).
90. See id. at 4 & 4 n.8 (“The lack of adequate national standard for hospital visitation
promotes inconsistencies with often devastating effect for LGBT patients and their
families.”).
91. Id.
92. 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2010).
93. § 482.13.
94. Id.
Standard: Patient visitation rights.  A hospital must have written policies and proce-
dures regarding the visitations rights of patients, including those setting forth any clini-
cally necessary or reasonable restriction or limitation that the hospital may need to
place on such rights and the reasons for the clinical restriction or limitation.  A hospi-
tal must meet the following requirements: . . . (3) Not restrict, limit, or otherwise deny
visitation privileges on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, gender identity,
sexual orientation, or disability.
Id.
95. See With Hospital Visitation Regulations in Effect, Lambda Legal Thanks Client
Janice Langbehn and Obama Administration, LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan. 19, 2011), http://
www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/ny_20110119_with-hospital-visitation.html [hereinafter
LAMBDA LEGAL, Hospital Visitation] (telling story about one woman’s success in influenc-
ing new visitation regulations).
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and efforts to make policy changes was rewarded on May 2, 2011, when
Lambda Legal awarded her with its National Liberty Award.96
One question remains unanswered: should regular people, everyday
citizens, be required to practically march on Washington and seek vindi-
cation whenever they experience discrimination because of irrational
bias?  Although Janice Langbehn’s case influenced public policy and in
the process she became a spokesperson for civil rights, it was at the cost
of much suffering.  Her family experienced grave and inexcusable dis-
crimination, she lost her loving partner, and she lost her lawsuit—her
chance at restitution.  Perhaps Janice, like many people who experience
great injustice and loss, found a deeper meaning and redemption in her
civil rights work.97  But, as discussed more in Part IV, a better solution to
avoid such drastic measures would be to enact a comprehensive law,
which would address the deeply rooted societal prejudice by prohibiting
discriminatory treatment of sexual minorities.  After all, there has to be a
remedy that will allow LGBT, like other minorities with a history of dis-
crimination and social stigma, to achieve equality without a need for a
picket sign or a newspaper headline.
III. THE LANGBEHN-POND FAMILY IS NOT ALONE
One might consider the suffering of the Langbehn-Pond family to be
just an isolated incident, so outrageous and extreme in nature, that it
would be nearly anomalous in an increasingly egalitarian society.  How-
ever, a brief survey of the past three decades reveals plenty of cases in-
volving discrimination against same-sex couples in emergency medical
96. LAMBDA LEGAL, Langbehn, supra note 83 (discussing policy changes imple-
mented by the hospital following the Langbehn case, including visitations rights, and up-
dated definition of family to include same-sex partners and other people who may not be
legally related to a patient); LAMBDA LEGAL, Hospital Visitation, supra note 95.
97. See GOFFMAN, supra note 26, at 26–27 (pointing out that stigmatized groups desig-
nate representatives, who are vocal about the group’s complaints, aspirations, politics, and
atrocities, and who often find that the “movement” absorbs all their time, taking on quali-
ties of a profession); see also, CHARLES, supra note 19, at 263 (discussing how the persever-
ance of Karen Thompson served as a model for “making justice ad became legal and
political precedent for the equality and respect for LGBT).
The guardianship of Sharon Kowalski acts as a metaphor for the stewardship of a
political and social struggle for legal rights, whether those be health benefits for same-
sex partners, employment discrimination laws, or hate crimes statutes.  Unless the les-
bian and gay community states its preference out loud in every venue, it will continue
as a ward of a state that depends on that community’s incapacity and confines that
queer ward in a closet.
Id.
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situations.98  The three selected cases discussed below are just examples.
They demonstrate that regardless of whether openly gay or closeted, with
or without advance medical directives, sexual minorities experience grave
prejudice, for which they lack adequate legal remedies.
A. In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski
Perhaps the worst example of discrimination, bigotry, and injustice is
the case In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, involving Karen Thomp-
son and Sharon Kowalski, a lesbian couple who lived in rural Minne-
sota.99  In November of 1983, “after four years of a committed and
extremely closeted relationship, Sharon was hit by a drunk driver while
driving in Northern Minnesota.”100  As a result of the accident, Sharon
suffered severe brain injuries and was paralyzed (wheelchair-bound).  Ini-
tially, Karen acted as a caretaker for Sharon, but she became concerned
the Kowalski family would prevent her from seeing Sharon; so, in an at-
tempt to remain involved in Sharon’s medical treatment and rehabilita-
98. See Letter, supra note 87, at 2 & 2 n.5 (discussing changes needed to ensure visita-
tion rights for all patients). Lambda Legal conducted a national healthcare survey in Feb-
ruary of 2010, which confirmed and underscored “the pervasive discrimination against
LGBT people in healthcare settings, and . . . visitation discrimination is part of a larger
dynamic that leads to systematically poorer health outcomes for LGBT people.” Id.
Countless LGBT people in this country continue to endure hardships because health
care provider prejudice, ignorance and apathy needlessly keep patients isolated from
their families and other supportive loved ones in times of medical crisis.  The LGBT
community members that . . . [Lambda Legal] serve[s] have reported being barred
from a dying partner’s bedside, . . . choosing to skip necessary procedures because
their partner was not allowed to stay with them overnight, . . . being turned away when
offering important medical information about their partner or child, and otherwise
being treated as a stranger, or at best, a “friend,” although their relationship to the
patient was, by all fair measures, unmistakably familiar and supportive in nature.
Id. at 2. See generally Cain, supra note 10 (discussing the legal history of the gay rights
movement); HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., HEALTHCARE EQUALITY INDEX (2010),
available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HealthcareEqualityIndex_2010.pdf
(explaining that the survey monitors facility policies in order to prevent or remedy discrim-
inatory treatment, and to ensure LGBT healthcare needs are adequately met).  Healthcare
Equality Index is an annual survey of healthcare policies related to LGBT patients and
their families, compiling data from 178 healthcare facilities in 21 states and the District of
Columbia. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra.
99. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);
CHARLES, supra note 19, at 8 (“The late Tom Stoddard, director of the Lambda Legal Fund
Defense Fund, called the Kowalski struggle the most important and compelling legal case
concerning lesbian and gay rights in his lifetime.”); THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra
note 19, at 2 (discussing in great detail the circumstances of the case and relationship be-
tween Sharon and Karen).
100. THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 20, at 1.
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tion, she revealed to Sharon’s parents they were lovers.101  Sharon’s
family became enraged and prevented Karen from visiting Sharon.102  In
the spring of 1984, Sharon’s father, Donald Kowalski, cross-petitioned for
Sharon’s guardianship,103 and the nearly eight-year legal battle “to bring
Sharon home” ensued.104  Karen initially agreed to appointing of Mr. Ko-
walski as the guardian, because she believed she would be granted visita-
tion rights; but instead, with the court’s approval, Sharon’s father
terminated Karen’s ability to visit and relocated Sharon to a remote nurs-
ing home 200 miles away.105
Ironically, the couple kept their relationship secret to avoid the moral
judgment of their families and rural community.106  But after the acci-
dent, in order to raise money for the mounting legal bills and to advance
her cause, Karen was forced to publicize their story and to fight her battle
in the public arena.107  Three years later, the court ordered physicians to
examine Sharon in order to determine whether she was capable of ex-
pressing her wishes regarding visitations.108  The court reinstated Karen’s
101. Id. (discussing the story of two partners who experienced bigotry when they de-
cided to reveal their hidden relationship).
102. Id. (explaining that Karen sought the advice of medical and legal professionals
when Sharon’s family asked her to stop visiting Sharon); Fajer, supra note 19, at 581–83
(“During the court battles over guardianship and visitation, the Kowalskis consistently de-
nied that their daughter was in a lesbian relationship . . . Sharon’s father accused the court
that granted Thompson’s visitation rights [Feb. 1989] of ‘legalizing a lesbian relation-
ship.’”); Rivera, supra note 20, at 896 (stating that the Kowalskis indicated that if Thomp-
son were allowed to see Sharon, she would sexually molest her).
103. Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791 (explaining that “[i]n March of 1984, both Thomp-
son and Sharon’s father, Donald Kowalski cross-petitioned for guardianship”); Fajer, supra
note 19, at 581.  Although Sharon and Karen purchased a house together, exchanged rings,
and named each other as insurance beneficiaries, they did not execute mutual power of
attorney nor advance medical directives.  Fajer, supra note 19. Therefore, their relation-
ship lacked legally-recognized status. Id.
104. THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 19 app. A (providing a timeline of sig-
nificant events); CHARLES, supra note 19, at 14 (“Thompson’s legal battle became a rally-
ing cry for a movement reeling from the disability and death associated with AIDS
pandemic, her separation and legal mistreatment dramatizing the deepest fear of same-sex
partners.”).
105. Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791.
106. Rivera, supra note 19, at 895 (stating that Thompson was a teacher and feared
losing her job if it was discovered she was a lesbian).
107. CHARLES, supra note 19, at 1 (stating that Karen’s efforts “outside the courtroom
begun to play a major role in the case, demonstrating how law functions as a historically
and socially conditioned process, one that is influenced by contexts as seemingly far re-
moved from the public sphere as the bedroom, as the private predilection of romantic
lowers.”).
108. Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791.  In “1988, Judge Robert Campbell ordered special-
ists at Miller-Dawn Medical Center to examine Sharon to determine her level of function-
ing and whether Sharon could express her wishes on visitation.” Id.
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visitation rights in January of 1989 after doctors concluded that Sharon
wanted to see Karen.109  Upon the doctor’s recommendation Sharon was
moved to a different facility and Karen was allowed to bring Sharon
home “for semi-monthly weekend visits.”110  Prior to this arrangement, in
1988, Mr. Kowalski had petitioned the court to terminate his guardian-
ship due to a medical condition.111  Karen filed an uncontested request to
be appointed Sharon’s subsequent guardian, but in a truly incredible and
cruel twist of events, the court granted the guardianship to Kowalski’s
family friend, Karen Tomberlin, who testified against Sharon, but never
filed a petition for guardianship.112  Karen appealed, and on December
17, 1991, after years of litigation, and a grassroots movement to recognize
Sharon’s rights to choose her caregiver, the court concluded that Karen’s
suitability for guardianship was “overwhelmingly clear from the testi-
mony of Sharon’s doctors and caretakers.” and she was finally awarded
guardianship.113
The Kowalski case was filed in 1984, and it was virtually the first of its
kind.  Although it ultimately had a happy ending, it is a sobering re-
minder and a testimonial of the longstanding and comprehensive history
of discrimination against gender minorities, most notably, gays and lesbi-
ans.114  Foremost, it is a cautionary tale for same-sex couples to be proac-
tive and to take the necessary measures to protect their rights and assets
in an event of unforeseen medical emergencies.  Although, as illustrated
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 791–92.  “On April 23, 1991, the trial court denied Thompson’s petition for
guardianship and simultaneously appointed Tomberlin as guardian without conducting a
separate hearing into her qualifications.” Id. at 792  “Thompson appealed to [this] court.”
Id.
113. In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
[I]t should be made clear that this court is also reversing specific restrictions on the
guardian’s decision-making power that might be read into the trial court order.  She is
free to make whatever decisions she and the doctors feel free are necessary to achieve
Sharon’s best interests, including decisions regarding Sharon’s location.
Id.
114. See CHARLES, supra note 19, at 14 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., GAYLAW,
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 2 (1999)) (“[It is still] difficult to identify
any other group of American citizens who are currently less protected under the United
States Constitution than are gays and lesbians.”); Fajer, supra note 19 at 583 (confirming
society’s refusal to acknowledge or accept homosexual relationships).  “[T]he saga of
Karen and Sharon exposes not only a vindictive family and an undependable judiciary, but
also repulsive and lawless forces.  The Kowalski family actually made the courts into unwit-
ting co-conspirators in their own form of lesbian bashing.” AMY D. RONNER,
HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW, 42 (2005).
472 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:447
by Langbehn,115 Flanigan,116 and Reed,117 drawing proper legal docu-
ments may not suffice (it does not provide the certainty one would ex-
pect), but it is a necessary first step towards preserving freedom of choice
because of two dismal realities.118  The first reality is that even if states
grant substantially the same rights and responsibilities to same-sex
couples as those enjoyed by a heterosexual married couple, the federal
government does not recognize these unions under federal programs.119
Second, state laws do not have to recognize legal unions from other
115. See supra Part II.A–B (elaborating on specific instances in which having pre-
pared the proper legal documents in advance would have helped protect a homosexual
partner’s rights in unanticipated medical emergencies).
116. See infra Part III.A (demonstrating patterns of systematic discrimination against
homosexuals in emergent medical situations, even when the proper legal paperwork has
been completed).
117. See infra Part III.B (providing another example of an individual in a loving, com-
mitted, same-sex relationship being denied access to her partner and adequate legal
remedies).
118. See DENIS CLIFFORD, ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN & GAY COUPLES
136–37 (Emily Doskow ed., 15th ed. 2010) (pointing out that hospitals and doctors often
conveniently look to the immediate family for authority to act (in absence of documents
giving the power to the partner)).  As a result, a partner is often forced to look in horror
while the doctor is instructed regarding treatment in ways that the lover knows to be con-
trary to his partner’s wishes. Id. at 136.  “When a person is ill or incapacitated, someone
must pay bills, deposit checks, and make other financial matters.  And traditionally, the
authority to make financial decisions belongs to a spouse, not a lover or friend.” Id. at 139.
Some scholars believe that:
Same-sex partners face greater challenges than many heterosexual couples in ensuring
that their partners and families are protected after their deaths.  Specific considera-
tions must be addressed that will benefit couples whether married or unmarried, het-
erosexual or homosexual. . . .  The most important planning documents that one can
give oneself – and often surviving spouse – are a will, a health care proxy, or durable
power of attorney, and a declaration of homestead.
Aimee Bouchard & Kim Zadworthy, Growing Old Together: Estate Planning Concerns For
the Aging Same-Sex Couple, 30 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 713, 726 (2008). See also Fajer,
supra note 19 at 581 (noting that homosexual couples are otherwise without legal standing
to make decisions for each other during times of incapacitation); Elizabeth Schwartz, Top
Ten Legal Protections for Gays & Lesbians, ELIZABETH F. SCHWARTZ: ATTORNEYS &
MEDIATORS, http://www.sobe law.com/top10.html (last visited on Oct. 9, 2011) (providing a
guide of ten legal documents every same-sex couple [in Florida] should have, when appli-
cable, including: will, properly titled deed and accounts, durable power of attorney, desig-
nation of healthcare surrogate, living will, designation of pre-need guardian, designation of
pre-need guardian for minor child, beneficiary designations, co-habitation agreements, and
co-parenting agreements).
119. CLIFFORD, supra note 118, at 17–18.
The federal government does not recognize a Massachusetts marriage nor a domestic
partner registration or civil union in any other state.  This means that none of the over
1,000 federal rights that . . . apply to marriage apply to same-sex couples, no matter
how significant their legal relationship is under [the] state law.  For example, same-sex
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states, and they presume that legally unmarried people are heterosex-
ual.120  Thus, same-sex couples, who do not exercise advance medical di-
rectives, powers of attorney, wills, or other necessary legal documents to
protect their legal rights, may be subject to a state-mandated “order of
preference.”121  As a result, property and medical decision-making rights
will often be granted to a blood relative in lieu of the same-sex partner, if
an LGBT individual dies intestate or becomes incapacitated during a
medical crisis and has not legally named a healthcare proxy.122  Thus, in
the absence of legislative or judicial consensus regarding the medical and
financial decision-making rights of LGBT couples, it behooves these
couples to execute suitable legal documents to preserve the, albeit imper-
fect, legal protections afforded to them under current state and federal
laws.123
couples cannot take advantage of Social Security benefits, immigration privileges, or
the marriage exemption to federal estate tax.
Id. at 29. See  Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 118, at 725 (explaining that [s]ame-sex
couples often face intolerance by their own families, making them subject to intestacy laws,
which “primarily direct inheritance to biological family members by a matter of relation-
ship hierarchy, effectively cutting a partner out of any share of the decedent’s estate”).
However, “despite inadequacies of intestacy, a ‘number of studies suggest that the majority
of the population dies intestate.’” Id. at 726.  See also Statistics Regarding Status of Same-
Sex Relationships Nationwide, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/
articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2011) (stating
that only seven states recognize marriage equality, while twenty-nine states have constitu-
tional amendments restricting marriage to a union between man a woman, and forty-five
states bar same-sex marriage by statute).
120. CLIFFORD, supra note 118, at 31 (noting that some states may treat homosexual
unions as married, while others treat the parties as single, unrelated adults).
121. Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 118, at 715, 725 (discussing common state
intestacy law relationship hierarchies that can cut a surviving LGBT partner out of the
decedent’s estate); CLIFFORD, supra note 118, at 4 (highlighting the lack of federal and
state protections for same-sex couples in matters of property, tax, and end of life health-
care decisions).
122. Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 118, at 715, 725–26, 745 (discussing the com-
mon occurrence of a LGBT person’s estate passing to her parent or distant relative, and
the medical proxy hierarchy for many states that includes adult children, parents, or adult
siblings before or to the exclusion of a same-sex partner); Hospital Rights, ALTERNATIVES
TO MARRIAGE PROJECT, http://www.unmarried.org/hospital-rights.html#rights (last visited
Oct, 10, 2011) (explaining that, in many states, close friends and domestic partners are
either at the bottom of the medical proxy list or completely prevented from making medi-
cal decisions for an incapacitated loved one).
123. See Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 118, at 743 (explaining that it is important
for LGBT couples to execute legal documents concerning medical and financial decision-
making powers in order to avoid the possibility of these powers being stripped away from
them in the event of an unforeseeable death or incapacitation).  “Everyone should be cau-
tious about planning for their future, and ultimately, their death, but it is especially impor-
tant for same-sex couples who do not have the benefit of default rules for legally
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B. Flanigan v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.
Another case that showcases a systemic pattern of discrimination in-
volves Bill Flanigan and Robert Daniel, life partners who were together
for nearly five years before Robert’s death in October of 2000.124  Over
the years, Robert’s health progressively deteriorated due to HIV, and Bill
took an active role in Robert’s treatment as his caregiver.125  Unlike the
Kowalski case, to protect their rights, the couple had signed a durable
power of attorney, appointing each other as health care proxies.126  In his
power of attorney, Robert specified medical circumstances under which
“he did not wish to receive life-sustaining treatment.”127  Living with un-
certainty of Robert’s chronic medical condition prompted the couple to
engage in honest conversations about each other’s wishes in the event of
medical crisis.  Robert feared hospitals and doctors and repeatedly stated
his aversion to having his life prolonged by artificial means.128
The events giving rise to the lawsuit began on October 15, 2000 when
Robert became severely ill while visiting family in Washington, DC.129
Bill took Robert to the nearest hospital, where the attending physician
advised the couple that Robert’s lungs were failing and he required a
respirator.130  Robert unequivocally refused intubation, and his condition
quickly deteriorated.131  The next day the treating physician advised Bill
that Robert’s condition was critical and he required surgery at a better-
equipped facility.132  Robert was transferred by ambulance to a trauma
center, along with his file that contained the durable power of attorney,
appointing Bill as his healthcare proxy.133  Upon arrival at approximately
6:30 p.m., Bill immediately spoke to the trauma center staff in order to
recognized relationships to plan for the future to ensure that their loved ones are pro-
tected.” Id. at 749.
124. Flanigan Complaint, supra 21, at 4.  “Bill and Daniel had a warm and supportive
relationship, and were committed to each other as a couple, emotionally and financially.”
Id.
125. Id. at 5.  “Flanigan attended Daniel’s doctor and hospital visits, fed and cleansed
Daniel when he was especially weak, and gave him prescribed injections.” Id.
126. Id.  “Daniel and Flanigan took steps to ensure that Flanigan’s authority as
Daniel’s closest family member would not be questioned in health care settings.” Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Flanigan Complaint, supra note 21, at 6.
130. Id.  “Immediately after the discussion with the attending physician, Flanigan and
Daniel phoned Daniel’s primary care physician in California, who stressed that Flanigan
would need to play a central role in ensuring that Daniel’s wishes regarding life-sustaining
measures such as a breathing tube were honored.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6–7.
133. Id. at 7.  The file also contained a note that Bill was Robert’s most significant
personal contact). Id.
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inform the physicians that Robert was very “vulnerable medically,” be-
cause of his extremely low T-cell count and Bill stressed that Robert did
not wish for any life-prolonging measures (such as a breathing tube).134
The clerk assured Bill that she would relay the information to the sur-
geon, but Bill became concerned when, by 7 p.m., the staff had not pro-
vided Bill with an update on Robert’s condition.135  In fact, the staff did
not even confirm that Robert arrived at the trauma center, so Bill called
the transferring hospital, and was told that Robert left that facility at 6:10
p.m.136  Desperate for an update, Bill spoke to the trauma center clerk,
who verified that Robert was admitted and assured Bill the nurse would
come out to get him shortly.137
At 7:15 p.m. Bill picked up the phone in the waiting area, designated
for patient inquiries, and after identifying himself, he was told that “only
‘family’ members were allowed to see patients in the Shock Trauma
Center, and that ‘partners’ did not qualify.”138  Bill, once again, explained
he had power of attorney, and after being placed on hold, was told
“somebody would come and get him.”139  After another agonizing few
minutes, Bill requested to speak to a manager, and over the next three
hours, he continued to beg and plead with hospital staff for access to
Robert.140  Meanwhile, as in the Langbehn case, Bill observed other fam-
ilies upon arrival, being briefed by the physicians and gaining access to
their loved ones.141  Four hours after arriving at the trauma center, Rob-
ert’s sister arrived and she immediately received an update on Robert’s
condition.142  Soon after Robert’s mother arrived, the staff finally granted
Bill (and the family) access.143  Unfortunately, Robert was no longer con-
134. Flanigan Complaint, supra note 21, at 8 (“Flanigan also needed to support
Daniel, to have Daniel know that he was present, and to say goodbye if that became neces-
sary, as they had promised each other.”).
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Flanigan Complaint, supra note 21, at 9–10.  “Flanigan begun to cry, saying that
he wanted to be able to say goodbye to Daniel.  He was put on hold, and then was told that
a nurse would come to get him in approximately ten minutes.  He was in an obviously
fragile emotional state.” Id.
140. Id. at 10.  “Increasingly demoralized and distraught, Flanigan asked the recep-
tionist repeatedly over [a period] of three more hours for access to Daniel.  The reception-
ist put Flanigan off each time.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id.
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scious, his eyes were taped, and he was attached to a ventilator.144  Rob-
ert died three days later.145
Bill filed a suit, with the assistance of Lambda Legal, against the
trauma center, alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.146  The case was tried and the jury found for the defendant.147
Once again, we see raw discrimination, and in this case it was actually
exacerbated by a battery, when the trauma center performed intubation
directly in contradiction to Robert’s wishes, as expressly stated in his le-
gal documents.  And, similar to the plaintiffs in Langbehn and Reed, Bill
Flanigan did not have any remedy.
C. Reed v. AMN Healthcare148
The third case, filed in Washington State Court, concerns Sharon Reed,
who was barred access to her life partner, Jo Ann Ritchie, in intensive
care, the night before her partner’s death.149  Sharon and Jo Ann were a
couple for seventeen years, and for years, Jo Ann suffered from a number
of medical conditions which required frequent hospitalizations.150  Con-
sequently, Jo Ann had executed the necessary documents, including a du-
144. Flanigan Complaint, supra note 21, at 11.  “Flanigan remained at Daniel’s side
during all available visiting hours, but never saw Daniel conscious again.” Id.  “According
to a nurse at Defendant Hospital, Daniel apparently regained consciousness for a brief
time during one of the final two nights of his life [after visiting hours]” and he attempted to
pull out his breathing tube.  Id.  The hospital staff “responded by tying down Daniel’s
arms.” Id. at 12.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3 (alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress in
keeping Bill from visiting Daniel in the hospital and assisting in decisions regarding his
medical care according to Daniel’s advance directives).
147. Flanigan v. University of Maryland Hospital System, LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 27,
2002), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/flanigan-v-university-of-maryland.html.
Bill Flanigan and Robert Daniel’s story has been a key feature in presentation to state
and local legislators around the country, and part of nationwide educational work that
led vice presidential candidate John Edwards to raise the importance of hospital visita-
tion rights for same-sex couples in the 2003 debates.  In conjunction with this lawsuit,
Lambda Legal distributed an action kit to the same-sex partners across the country to
help make sure their local hospitals honor national accreditation standards and allow
partners to visit loved ones.
Id.
148. While the official case reporter lists the defendant as ANM Healthcare, various
documents filed by both sides list the defendant as AMN Healthcare.  After a thorough
search, there is no such company as ANM Healthcare, so all documents have been
renamed to reflect the proper corporation.
149. Reed v. AMN Healthcare, 225 P.3d 1012, 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2008).
150. Id.
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rable power of attorney and making Sharon her health care proxy and the
personal representative of her estate.151
The events giving rise to the allegations in the complaint began to un-
fold on August 30, 2005 when Sharon brought Jo Ann to the Washington
Medical Center.152  Jo Ann complained of shortness of breath and was
admitted.153  During her hospitalization, Jo Ann often said that she was
afraid of being left alone.154  However, she was allowed unrestricted visi-
tations from her partner and other family members, and one of them
would stay by Jo Ann’s bedside at all times.155
Things changed on September 3, 2005 when, at approximately 4 p.m.,
Jo Ann’s condition worsened and she was admitted to the Intensive Care
Unit (ICU).156  At that time, Jo Ann repeated her plea to Sharon to not
leave her alone, because she was scared,157 and Sharon promised to stay
by her side.  From the time of admission to the ICU until 11 p.m., Sharon
and other family members were allowed access to Jo Ann.158  Around 11
p.m., when the doctor advised Sharon that Jo Ann’s condition was grave,
Sharon asked the doctor whether she would be able to stay with Jo Ann
throughout the night; the doctor assured Sharon that she could, but when
the night shift nurse, Defendant Karen E. Hulley arrived, she ordered
Sharon out of the room.159  Several times, throughout the night, Sharon
tried to enter Jo Ann’s room, but she was repeatedly denied access.160
On one occasion, she also noticed the nurse “roughly shoving a bed pan”
under Jo Ann, and when Sharon offered to help, the nurse yelled at her
to “get out.”161  The nurse later explained that she denied Sharon access
in the best interest of the patient, alleging that Sharon was agitating Jo
151. Id.  In the durable power of attorney, Jo Ann authorized Sharon the following:
“to provide for companionship for me and to be accorded the status of a family member
for purposes of visitation and to provide for such companionship for me as will meet my
needs and preferences at a time when I am disabled or otherwise unable to arrange for
such companionship.” Id. See also Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 1–2, Reed, 225 P.3d 1012 (No.
06-2-16160-2SEA), 2010 WL 1689082, at *1–2.
152. Reed, 225 P.3d at 1012–13.
153. Id.
154. Id.  Quoting Jo Ann as stating “I’m scared.  Don’t leave me.” Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Reed v. AMN Healthcare, 225 P.3d 1012, 1013 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2008).
“One of the things her [Sharon’s] partner said to her was, ‘I’m afraid of dying. Don’t leave
me alone,’ said Judith A. Longnquist, a lawyer for Ms. Reed.  “That’s why the suffering
was so enormous – she felt as if her partner was thinking she had betrayed her trust.”
Parker-Pope, supra note 49.
158. Reed, 225 P.3d at 1013.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Ann, worsening her respiratory status.162  At 7 a.m. the next morning
when the nurse’s shift ended, Sharon was allowed to visit Jo Ann, but at
that time Jo Ann was in a “drugged state . . . and [she] died a few hours
later.”163
Sharon filed suit against the hospital and the nurse claiming the tort of
outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on the
nurse’s refusal of visitation rights to Sharon.164  The case showed early
signs of victory and the promise to advance visitations rights for same-sex
partners, because the nurse’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied
and affirmed on appeal.165  However, the celebration was premature be-
cause in April 2010, the case went to trial and Sharon lost.166  Therefore,
like in the Langbehn and Flanigan cases, same-sex couples who were in
committed long-term, loving relationships, endured the loss of a loved
one without having the ability to say their last goodbyes, and could not
get an adequate legal remedy.
IV. SOLUTION
A. Inadequacy of Legal Options Available to Langbehn-Pond Family
and Other Same-Sex Couples
One might argue that Janice’s claims in Langbehn  would have been
sufficient if they were based on a theory which made the discrimination
claim more prominent.  However, based on the state of current jurispru-
dence and legislation regarding rights of gender minorities, she pursued
the best claims available to her.  Like many other same-sex couples, Lisa
Marie and Janice could be discriminated against without adequate legal
recourse because LGBT are not considered a protected class under the
Constitution.167  Furthermore, there is no uniform federal legislation re-
162. Id.
163. Reed, 225 P.3d at 1013.  The Final Brief states that:
The traumatic interactions that Reed had with [nurse] Hulley who took it upon herself
to impose egregious, arbitrary, dictatorial and punitive restrictions upon Reed by in-
humanely prohibiting her from being with her loved one in the most tenuous last
hours of Ritchie’s life inflicted severe emotional distress upon Reed, for which she had
since been under a doctor’s care.  Hulley’s actions also significantly exacerbated
Reed’s difficult task of coming to terms with her partner’s death. . . .  She remains
haunted by the events of that terrible night.
Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, supra note 151, at 5.
164. Reed, 225 P.3d at 1013.
165. Id. (“[A] reasonable jury could infer that Hulley’s decision to exclude Reed was
motivated by reasons other than her medical judgment.”).
166. Special Verdict Form, Reed, 225 P.3d 1012 (No.06-2-16160-2 SEA), 2010 WL
1689087.  The jury did not find intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
167. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy was invalid but declining to identify neither the funda-
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garding medical rights for same-sex couples, which would provide guide-
lines for the medical providers168 or instill fear of penalty for would-be
offenders.  Basically, the states decide how to address the medical rights
of LGBT,169 making same-sex couples vulnerable to unequal treatment
based on their geographical location.  Because the regulation extending
hospital visitation rights to same-sex partners applies only to federally
funded healthcare facilities,170 the state legislatures and private hospitals
mental right it was protecting nor the applicable level of scrutiny it applied to reach its
decision); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (deciding that under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, homosexuals are not a suspect class and
thus holding that laws potentially discriminatory against homosexuals must be analyzed
under the more deferential rational basis review), but cf. Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties
of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 137 (2007)
(illustrating the differences between the Romer and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(holding that the Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy was invalid but declining
to identify neither the fundamental right it was protecting nor the applicable level of scru-
tiny it applied to reach its decision) opinion).
The equality discussed in the Lawrence opinion is the same as the equality discussed in
Romer: equality of status for a social group defined by sexual orientation.  Yet, the
Court rested the Lawrence decision not on an equal protection ground, but rather on
Fourteenth Amendment liberty – that is substantive due process.  Although the opin-
ion in Lawrence, neither identified a fundamental interest nor suggested a standard of
review that would require the state to offer important or compelling justification for
its restriction on liberty, it did insist on some significant justification beyond the moral
disproval of homosexuality that had sufficed in Hardwick.
Karst, supra.
168. Anisa Mohanty, Comment, Medical Rights for Same-Sex Couples and Rainbow
Families, 13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 367, 367–71 (2009).  The author discusses the inconsis-
tencies in the law with regard to medical rights of same-sex couples. Id. at 367.  Although
beyond the scope of this article, but pertinent to the Langbehn-Pond case—the author
addresses the issue of medical visitation rights involving non-biological children, who are
not treated the same as non-biological children of heterosexuals. Id. at 372.  As such, het-
erosexual stepparents are often considered in loco parentis, even in the absence of adop-
tion, such provisions often are not extended to homosexuals. Id. at 370.  Only in states that
recognize same-sex marriages, unions, or domestic partnerships and include in loco paren-
tis clauses for stepparents, the visitation privileges will be extended to children of same-sex
couples. Id.
169. Id. at 367–69.  “There are various states’ hospital visitation policies, ranging from
VA and NC, which allow a patient to designate visitors, regardless of whether such visitor
is related to the patient, to Florida, where there is no legal obligation to allow, visitors,
including same-sex partners in an emergency situation.” Id. at 369.
170. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 482, 485 (2010) (regulating hospitals to comply with the advance
directives of the patient); see Presidential Memorandum, supra note 83 (stating hospitals
that participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs must abide by the advance directives
of the patients).  “It should be made clear that designated visitors, including individuals
designated by legally valid advance directives . . . should enjoy visitation privileges that are
no more restrictive than those that immediately family members enjoy.”  Presidential
Memorandum, supra note 83.
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define their own scope of hospital visitation rights.  Typically, these visita-
tion rights extend first to spouses and then to immediate family mem-
bers.171  Thus, the definition of a “spouse” in the particular state will
dictate whether same-sex partners will be granted visitation rights.172
Moreover, some states, including Florida, where the Langbehn case
arose, set up a hierarchy of visitation rights based on the relationship be-
tween the prospective visitor and the patient.173  And here again, we ar-
rive at the big issue of gay marriage.174  Since Florida does not recognize
same-sex unions,175 same-sex partners fall only under a distant seventh
hierarchical category, defined by the statue as “a close friend of the pa-
tient,” and superior only to “a clinical social worker.”176  Thus, in case of
Langbehn-Pond family, where the hospital was displaying raw prejudice
171. Mohanty, supra note 168, at 376–77.  The author offers “the most convincing
argument” why same-sex partners are not extended medical decision making rights is “the
threat of medical malpractice by blood relatives.” Id. at 376.
Health care providers can ill afford to disclose health information to the ‘wrong’ per-
son or allow the ‘wrong’ individual to make decisions on behalf of a patient.  Providers
may be subject to great financial liability and medical ethics violations for refusing a
blood relative to make decisions regarding an incapacitated patient.
Id.
172. Id. at 367.  “[A] number of cases have demonstrated that same-sex partners are
routinely denied visitation rights, and even with the requisite legal documentation, are de-
nied the right to have whom they choose to make decisions for them.  Greater burdens
must be placed on physicians to honor patients’ wishes.” Id.
173. Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
174. See John G. Culhane, Public Health & Marriage (Equality), in RECONSIDERING
LAW AND POLICY DEBATES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 89 (John G. Culhane ed.,
2011) (discussing the public debate about same-sex marriage, pointing out that “[e]ven the
terms of engagement have been a bone of contention”).
Those favoring marriage rights for same-sex couples have coined the term “marriage
equality” to make the point that basic principles of fairness and treating like cases
alike compels recognition of same-sex couples’ unions, whereas the most virulent op-
ponents place the word marriage into alarmed and ironic quotation marks – homosex-
ual “marriage” – to signal that, in their worldview, such unions can never be true
marriages, even if the law deems it otherwise.
Id.; Mohanty, supra note 168, at 376–77 (“While it is tenuous whether a cause of action,
upon which to sue, exists for same-sex partners who are not in legally cognizable relation-
ship with the patient, failing to provide access and rights to same-sex partners is likely to
result in continue litigation.”); see also Evan Wolfson, Why Marriage Matters, FREEDOM TO
MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/why-marriage-matters1 (last visited on
Oct. 9, 2011) (discussing ways, in which government by denying same-sex right to marry,
punishes couples and families by depriving them tangible and intangible protections in
every area of life, including: death benefits, debts, divorce, family leave, health, housing,
immigration, inheritance, insurance, portability, parenting, privilege in judicial proceed-
ings, property rights, retirement benefits, and taxes).
175. Supra note 58 and accompanying text.
176. Fla. Stat. § 765.401 (2007).
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and moral judgment against Janice, Lisa Marie, and their children, the
law was its co-conspirator.  Even though the couple took legal steps to
protect their rights and prepared for the eventuality of a medical emer-
gency, the state-run hospital did not have to recognize Janice’s rights as
Lisa Marie’s healthcare proxy, because Florida does not embrace same-
sex marriage.  Therefore, for the purposes of statutory interpretation,
Janice was not considered “a spouse,” but rather a “close friend.”177
Cases from various jurisdictions involving rights of same-sex couples in
medical emergencies, like Kowalski, Flanigan, and Reed, reveal inconsis-
tency and deficient outcomes.  However, the common aspect of the cases
reviewed for the purposes of this Note is that all three involve state-based
claims of negligence,178 which do not adequately frame the issues of the
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
B. Comprehensive Federal Legislature to Provide Umbrella Protection
for Sexual Minorities
The framers of the Constitution articulated the principles of democratic
citizenship as imperative in the struggle of the disadvantaged and yet ex-
cluded minorities to achieve the equality promised by the United States
Constitution.179  Particularly in the twentieth century, many of the minor-
ities considered second-class citizens achieved the democratic citizenship
status.180  However, the equality for LBGT is part of the “unfinished bus-
iness” of modern democracy.181  Although at the heart of our democratic
177. Id. (designating priority according to the relationship with the patient);
Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1331–32 (S.D.
Fla. 2009) (withholding information from the patient’s life partner because she was not
considered a family member).
178. Flanigan Complaint, supra note 21, at 3 (suing hospital for negligence and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress on behalf of himself and his deceased partner); In re
Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (filing peti-
tion for guardianship of paralyzed partner; Reed v. AMN Healthcare, 225 P.3d 1012, 1012
(Wash. App. Div. 1 2008) (bringing negligence suit against the critical care nurse who
barred her from her partner’s hospital room on the night of her partner’s death).
179. See KAPLAN, supra note 15, at 3.
180. Id.
181. See id. (describing his book Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Polit-
ics of Desire, the author indicates that the only way to achieve equality for the LGBT
community is to develop a “robust conception of lesbian and gay rights”).
Equality for lesbian and gay citizens entails the end of laws by which private sexual
activities between adults of the same-sex are defined as crimes; it requires the exten-
sion of civil rights laws to protect queer citizens against retaliation for exercising their
freedom to associate openly with others both social and political contexts.  Such a
conception of lesbian and gay rights depends on a strong reading of the demands of
democratic citizenship and the exigencies of desire in individual self-making.
Id.
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system are rights of individuals, the way to achieve them is through col-
lective, well-organized efforts (social movements), which address the dis-
crimination based on a trait common to all members of the group.182
Although each minority strives for independence in its own particular
way, discriminated classes share certain universal characteristics, such as
history of discrimination, social stigma, and inadequacy of political
representation.183
As recent history has shown, there are many ways in which an op-
pressed minority can advance their agenda for equality, and the obvious
one is through the legal system.184  However, LGBT have enjoyed only
limited success, and their status as a “constitutional underclass” re-
mains.185  Generally, the legal system “has a limited potential as an arena
182. See Id. at 3–4, 6 (discussing how identity of LGBT defines politics of sexuality
and “‘[q]ueer’” must necessarily be defined in opposition to dominant norms.”).  Thus, in a
society of “compulsory heterosexuality,” such nonconformity is actually manifested by sex-
ual minorities. Id. at 6.  At the same time, these minorities become “vulnerable to risks of
imposing exclusions of their own to defend their limited gains.” Id.  However, such ten-
dencies, “conflict with the egalitarian and contestatory character of modern democratic
aspiration.” Id. See RIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 17
[O]ur goal must be to build a political and social movement that attempts to weaken
hierarchies, challenge prejudices, and end inequalities in political, social, and cultural
life. The challenge is to do so in a way that rises above people’s sexual identities at the
same time that it respects those identities.
Id.
183. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (expressing the “long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination” in the United States); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 162 (1980) (discussing various mi-
norities, including homosexuals, in context of their qualifications for constitutional
suspicious classification).
Homosexuals for years have been the victims of both “first-degree prejudice” and
subtler forms of exaggerated we-they stereotyping.  It appears, however, that quite a
substantial percentage of the population is “gay,” and most of us must therefore inter-
act with homosexuals quite frequently.  [Thus] . . . shouldn’t that serve substantially to
neutralize the prejudices?  In this case it doesn’t, since a person’s homosexuality is not
normally a characteristic of which others who are not gay themselves become aware
simply, say, by working with him or her.  Our stereotypes – whether to the effect that
male homosexuals are effeminate, females “butch”; that they are untrustworthy and
menacing to children, or whatever – are likely to remain fixed, given our obliviousness
to the fact that the people around us may well be counterexamples.
Id.
184. See RIMMERMAN, supra note 8.
185. RIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 63. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190,
193–94 (1986) (explaining how, under current jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court does
not recognize LGBT as a protected class nor does it define a specific fundamental right
interest specifically related to sexual minorities).  Therefore claims of sexual orientation
discrimination are subject to rational review.  Under rational review, the discriminatory
state law is likely to be upheld. Id. at 193. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
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for major social reform” because it cannot construct a coherent public
policy; instead, it allows for merely narrow victories.186  In addition, judi-
cial power is limited, because as part of the system of separation of pow-
ers, it has to defer to the other two branches of government to implement
the laws.187  Finally, the Supreme Court hears a minimal number of cases,
and does so on a discretionary basis.188  Thus, it would be futile to rely on
certiorari as a door to meaningful change.
As demonstrated in the Langbehn, Reed, and Flanigan cases, relying on
a state-based cause of action to advance LGBT goals is not the most ef-
fective way to utilize resources, and such approach is also susceptible to
the particular political and moral climate of the various jurisdictions, as
well as to the state of national politics (administration) on the subject.189
As the Kowalski case shows us, where the litigation took almost a decade
to vindicate the rights of the victims, sometimes there is not enough time
or resources to pursue such a protracted litigation.  Lastly, inconsistency
of state-based actions only adds to the general muddle regarding LGBT
discrimination rights and fails to usher in comprehensive change.190
Since the ability of the judiciary is limited we must turn to the legisla-
tive branch, which would provide comprehensive, uniform protection to
limit, and eventually end discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The
most obvious analogy is to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in which Con-
gress “virtually in one fell swoop erased the legal barriers to racial equal-
(2003) (striking down a statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy, but the Court did not
specify level of scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (applying rational
review, the court found an amendment to the Colorado Constitution classifying homosexu-
als as unequal violated the Equal Protection Clause).
186. RIMMERMAN, supra note 8 at 62 (discussing limitations of a legal rights strategy,
but pointing out that even limited victories for LGBT, “victories that, while fragmented
and often uncoordinated, did provide some momentum for the post-Stonewall lesbian and
gay liberation movement”).
187. Id. (illustrating the challenges facing the judicial system in trying to implement
social reform).
188. Id. (providing reasons why the legal system has limited potential to be an arena
for major social reform).
189. Id. at 64 (listing variables affecting the extent to which an interest group will
pursue litigation and whether that strategy will target either the state government or na-
tional government).
190. But see RIMMERMAN, supra note 8 at 80 (illustrating the constraint put on state-
level politics by the Defense of Marriage Act).
Successful legal strategy would be part of a broader movement for progressive politi-
cal and social change, one that would challenge the classical liberal paradigm that
focuses on the individual and identity-based group rights and assumes an interest-
group, pluralistic approach to political and social change.
Id.
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ity that stood for generations.”191  Observing the patterns of
discrimination centered around harmful, dehumanizing stereotypes, such
as those observed in racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism, can be instructive
in fighting homophobia.192  As observed by David A. J. Richards: “[S]uch
claims include both demands for basic human rights of conscience,
speech, intimate life, and work and skeptical scrutiny of laws and policies
expressing homophobia rooted in structural injustice.”193  Richards as-
serts that homosexuality is “no more exclusively about sex than hetero-
sexuality, as deeply rooted in our humanity and as expressive, on just
terms, of our moral powers.”194  Sexuality is simply used to demoralize
and degrade a person to sex acts (like gays in military viewed as
predators), and this aspect, which the author calls “moral slavery,” is a
common denominator to sexism, racism, and homophobia.195  Thus, an
entire group of people, cast as moral deviants and degenerates becomes
vulnerable to attacks and alienation by society, which affects every aspect
of life: work, religion, politics, and health. Richards considers the discrim-
ination and torment experienced by sexual minorities as even more per-
vasive than for other minorities.196
Comprehensive LGBT legislation, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
would guarantee equal political, social, and economic rights to minorities.
191. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (now codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); see CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (Steven Locks Press 1985); RIM-
MERMAN, supra note 8 at 155 (“A minority group framework has provided lesbians and
gays with legitimacy by aligning them with other identity-based movements, including the
civil rights and women’s movement.”).
192. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS, RACE,
GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 188 (1999) (stating that the image of gender and sexu-
ality, “once so aggressively enforced against African[-]Americans, women, and Jews,” is
often enforced against homosexuals).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 97.
196. Id. at 189–90. The author continues the discussion of harmful effect of social
injustice:
The structural injustice of homophobia raises the same general issue, but at another,
perhaps deeper level that advances understanding of the political dynamics that sup-
port structural injustice in general.  Homophobia does not limit homosexuality to a
private sphere (as with gender) or a servile sphere (race), but to no legitimate sphere
of activity at all—a sphere defined by its unspeakability.  Such structural injustice in-
flicts a deeper injury to moral personality even than race and gender in the sense that
no legitimate cultural space at all is allowed to the thoughts, feelings, and actions, that
express spontaneous erotic feelings and attachments deeply rooted in one’s sense of
self as a person, let alone to integration of that sense of self into a fabric of convictions
about enduring personal and ethical value in living.
Id.
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From a pragmatic prospective, however, such comprehensive legislation
would not immediately end discrimination.197  Rather, its greatest value
would be the acknowledgment that LGBT are equal citizens, and that
their historical discrimination has been noted and deemed worthy of rem-
edy.198  Enacting a comprehensive legislation prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation, would allow LGBT individuals to simply live
their lives privately rather than assume the role and responsibility of so-
cial activists.199  On the other hand, such legislation would also emphasize
the very traits by which LGBT do not wish to be defined; those that lead
to social stigma.200  Similar to the case of the Civil Rights Act for racial
and gender discrimination, however, legislation would be the first step in
a long process of giving back to a severely subjugated minority.201
197. See WHALEN, supra note 191, at 7 (stating the Civil Rights Act could not over-
come or erase “by a stroke of the president’s pen on a parchment handed to him by Con-
gress” three and one-half centuries of dehumanization, because the effects of “constant
humiliation, substandard education, [and] inadequate . . . training” would take a long time
to translate into a better life).  It would require “time, national patience, and willingness by
minorities to pursue the educational and training opportunities now open to them,” as well
as vigilance to ensure the new law is followed. Id.
198. See KAPLAN, supra note 15, at 5 (arguing that the rights of lesbians and gay can
be vindicated “through collective political struggle and must be established in social and
ethical institutions”).  Thus, “[t]he integrity of private sphere of individual decision-making
will be protected only to the extent that it is recognized as such by political and legal
authorities and respected by popular opinion.” Id.  “[T]his is especially true where the
liberties in question are those of an unpopular minority.” Id.; Eskridge, A Social Construc-
tionist Critique, supra note 25 at 426–27 (explaining that the laws help to “define the class
of individuals stigmatized by their defining traits, but also contributed to the class willing-
ness to challenge, not only legal, but also social stigmas”).
199. See RIMMERMAN, supra note 8 at 62–64 (“[H]aving presidential and/or congres-
sional support for a public policy is perhaps even more crucial than judicial enforcement.”).
“Having the support of the President and/or Congress carries more practical weight be-
cause the executive and legislative branches can provide tangible resources to implement
the policies they favor.” Id. at 63–64.
200. See GOFFMAN, supra note 26 at 5 (describing sociological process of stigmatiza-
tion and the “the attitudes we normals have towards a person with a stigma”).  Thus, we
discriminate and construct elaborate stigma-theory, “an ideology to explain his [or her]
inferiority and account for the danger he [or she] represents, sometimes rationalizing ani-
mosity based on other differences, such as those of social class.” Id.
201. See RIMMERMAN, supra note 8 at 185 (calling for the need to challenge “hetero-
sexuality’s claim to normalcy,” which requires comprehensive initiatives, consisting of po-
litical and cultural changes, supported by LBGT’s “individual and collective acts of
courage and resistance”). See also, Jennifer Ann Abodeely, Comment, Thou Shall Not
Discriminate: A Proposal for Limiting First Amendment Defenses to Discrimination in Pub-
lic Accommodations, 12 SCHOLAR 585, 595 (2010) (stating that no amendment has been
offered to “add sexual orientation or gender” as protected classes under the Civil Rights
Act).
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Some scholars criticize the narrowness of a rights-based strategy based
on its inability to catalyze change and promote liberation.202  But, we
need to take steps to protect sexual minorities from the discrimination
experienced by Janice Langbehn, Bill Flanigan, Sharon Reed, Sharon Ko-
walski, their partners, and their families.  Although recent legislation is
promising, it is a piecemeal, reactionary, and incomplete measure, which
does not provide the necessary solution to the inequality and mistreat-
ment experienced by LGBT in medical emergencies.
V. CONCLUSION
As lawyers, we tend to posture, and in this regard, we don the robes of
chilly professionalism.  Sometimes, we feign embracing principles of ob-
jectivity and emotional restraint; in doing this, we “cover.”203  Yet, I can-
not “cover” as I find myself thinking about Lisa Marie, lying alone and
scared in a cold hospital room, without her loving family to comfort
her.204  From my extensive research of the file and the media coverage, I
know that inability to be with Lisa Marie was a truly traumatic experi-
ence for Janice.  I also wonder what Lisa Marie was thinking about during
these long eight hours, drifting in and out of consciousness, especially
after receiving her last rites.  Although it is not medically plausible that
Lisa Marie would have survived had Janice and the children been allowed
to see her earlier, I am certain that having her loved ones at her side
during the last hours of her life would have been beneficial.205
The Langbehn-Pond family did not ask for special treatment, but they
deserved equal treatment.  Because LGBT continue to be a target of dis-
202. See Id. at 167 (citing Dennis Altman) (“The gay movement must be concerned
not just with specific legal and electoral battles, but also with the far broader and more
amorphous ways in which homophobia is maintained through a complex structure of insti-
tutions, values, and often unconscious prejudices.”). See generally, Eskridge, A Social Con-
structionist Critique, supra note 25 (discussing importance of social movements and
defining three types, which are particularly relevant to law, including: “cultural change,”
“resource mobilization,” and “political process”).
203. WILLIAM I. MILLER, FAKING IT 77 (2003) (admitting that some emotions are
easier to fake than others).  He points to La Rochefoucauld, who said that generally “it is
harder to disguise emotions we have than to pretend [fake] those we do not.” Id.
204. Id. “I can cover up benevolence more easily than my sense of disgust, my sense
of satisfaction in a beautiful object more easily than my grief.” Id.
205. Amended Complaint, supra note 30, at 13–14, 16. “[B]ased on . . . [the hospital’s]
own medical forms and indications in Lisa Marie’s medical records, Lisa Marie was placed
in restraints throughout the evening in order to protect herself and because no family
members were allowed to provide [her] care and supervision.” Id. at 16. “Someone pre-
cious was taken from my family that day, someone we can never get back.  Lisa was denied
the right to be with her family and to hold my hand during the last moments of her life.”
Langbehn, supra note 30.
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crimination in medical emergencies and in other crucial aspects of their
lives, they need government protection in the form of a comprehensive
legislative measure.  Such legislation may not end all discrimination, but
it would transmit a potent message that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not acceptable.  Like the Civil Rights Act, such legislation
would provide a framework for legislation on state and local levels.  And
the legislation would eventually prompt change in social attitudes, be-
cause then society would have to rethink its general attitudes towards
sexual minorities.
In the face of a medical emergency, or in any other facet of life, LGBT
and their families deserve fair and equal treatment.  Consequently, the
definitions of “marriage” and “family,” imposed by society and enforced
by the legislature, should be expanded to include sexual minorities. Cov-
ers distort LGBT identity. Covers either force LGBT people into hiding
through assimilation, or impose implicit and explicit penalties for choos-
ing to live cover-free lives that discriminators, through a distorted lens of
a society, perceive as “flaunting.”206  A legislative measure is needed to
prompt change.  It pains me that during the final hours of their lives, Lisa
Marie, Mary Joe, and Robert were deprived the love and comfort of their
chosen families.
206. YOSHINO, supra note 1, at 90.  Author offers Michel Foucault’s explanation as to
why same-sex expressions of affection, which are virtually unnoticed in equivalent hetero-
sexual encounters, are perceived by public as “flaunting.” Id.  “People can tolerate two
homosexuals they see leaving together, but if the next day they’re smiling, holding hands
and tenderly embracing one another, they can’t be forgiven.  It is not the departure for
pleasure that is intolerable, it is waking up happy.” Id.  Yoshino concludes, that people,
even moralists, can find ways to consider the homosexual “departure for pleasure” as ab-
ject and fleeting, but the public finds the idea of gay couple demonstrating their relation-
ship works galling. Id.
